The sweltering heat of USA ’94 might have been assumed to dampen the attacking instincts
of sides; commentator Brian Moore referred to the authorities warning that a ‘survival
kit’ of vast quantities of water was needed to get
through the final just as a spectator.
Nonetheless, there was plenty of attacking football on
show and even, in the form of beaten finalists Italy,
the first major impact of concerted pressing on international football.
Italy, coached by the Arrigo Sacchi who had made A.C. Milan such
a force between 1987 and 1991 before taking over the Azzurri , employed similar tactics
to the Rossoneri . Sacchi lined up in a 4-4-2, with
one striker essentially playing as a number 10 in the hole, a high defensive line, and
immense vertical compactness.
By attempting to compress the pitch by having
no more than 25 metres between strikers and defenders, Sacchi created a natural press,
assisted by his wide midfielders tucking in and the
full-backs pushing up when out of possession to squeeze the opposition wide players.
Under Sacchi, the Italians had, by 1994, rid
themselves of sweepers and any form of catenaccio , although Franco Baresi , one
of the greatest of all defenders, was still used as an outlet to play long, forward passes.
However, Italy defended without a spare man, using
anticipation and positioning rather than intrusive man-for-man marking and a libero .
In attack, both full-backs got forward, while
central midfielders Dino Baggio and Demetri Albertini , while both capable of playing
a box-to-box role, tended to sit.
Roberto Baggio dropped into the hole behind Daniele Massaro,
and the energetic Nicola Berti and Roberto Donadoni played as classic wide midfielders,
rather than wingers, tucking in when required but also capable of giving width.
The Italians were incisive with the ball,
transitioning quickly with short passes and looking to
play wide or through Baggio, who had some licence to drift around when in possession;
Sacchi was not, however, totally comfortable with luxury players and his system did require
everyone to press, which led to some disputes between the boss and the Divine Ponytail.
Brazil, whose beat the attacking 4-4-2 of Sweden in the semi-finals, played a version
of the 4- 2-2-2 seen in our last video.
This was not nearly as creative in form as
it had been in 1982, however; Mauro Silva and Dunga were no Cerezo and Falcao.
Indeed, while Dunga did often play quick, long passes in
the fashion of a regista , Brazil’s use of Mauro Silva, dropping off to sit just in
front of the back four, especially when the full-backs
went forwards, would not look out of place in
Tottenham’s current system.
As with previous Brazilian 4-2-2-2’s, the
full-backs were required to do this to provide width,
though it was noticeable that Jorginho on the right, who was replaced by Cafu in the
final after injury, got forwards far more than Branco
on the left, despite Nicola Berti posing more of an attacking threat than Donadoni.
The front four of Romario and Bebeto , in
front of Mazinho and Zinho, played with fluidity, but the strikers were better players than
their supporting trequartistas , and so Brazil often
looked for the long pass from Dunga towards either Romario or Bebeto, both of whom
dropped deep, while Mazinho and Zinho broke wide to tie up the Italian defence.
While Brazil won, it was on penalties after
Baggio’s famous miss – Brazil’s fourth World Cup
title was surely its least satisfying, tactically and aesthetically.
France won on home soil in 1998, just as Uruguay
had in 1930, Italy in 1934, England in ’66, and Argentina in ’78.
They achieved this without an especially talented centre-forward,
either, using Stephane Guivarc’h , with Jonathan Wilson stating in Inverting the Pyramid
that “it may well be, from a technical point
of view, he is the worst centre-forward ever to win a World Cup.”
Aimee Jacquet , the French coach, needed to accommodate Zinedine Zidane ,
and ameliorate the weakness up front, without exposing the team defensively.
He did this using a 4-3-2-1.
In the 4-3-2-1, the so-called Christmas Tree
formation, a tough, solid central midfield three
can cover for the less defensively minded attacking midfielders, who can push up or
wide, or drop to gather the ball, as needed.
Width comes largely from full-back where for
France, Lilian Thuram and Bixente Lizarazu were outstanding both in attack and defence.
The midfield three, anchored by captain Didier Deschamps , also featured Manu Petit and Christian
Karembeu who, while solid and strong in the tackle, also had the energy to support
and could play line-breaking passes.
Up front, Guivrac’h played much as Serginho
did for Brazil in 1982, a strong, disruptive focal
point to hold up the ball and occupy the opposition’s central defenders, while behind him,
Youri Djorkaeff and the imperious Zidane created and moved into scoring positions.
The 4-3-2-1 requires excellent midfielders
in the five that split three/two, as well as
energetic full-backs who can provide width in attack while also getting back to defend
to stop the midfield having to drop too deep.
France had such good players that it worked, even with Guivarc’h up front.
Their opponents, Brazil, were beaten 3-0, perhaps a final defeat for the 4-2-2-2.
Under coach Mario Zagallo, who had won as a player in
’58 and ’62, and as a manager in ’70, Brazil also
relied on the energetic full-backs Roberto Carlos and Cafu for width.
Unlike previous Brazil sides, where the right-sided full-back was
more attacking, both played almost as wing-backs in 1998, with Cesar Sampaio anchoring and
Dunga again passing long from deep.
The system was different from the pure 4-2-2-2
of 1982 and 1994, with both Leonardo and Rivaldo more comfortable attacking from wide,
and also both able to drop deeper and tuck inside so that the full-backs created genuine overlaps.
With Ronaldo, scorer of four goals in the
tournament prior to the final, up front assisted by
the wily Bebeto, who dropped off into a more creative role in the hole, the formation could
resemble a 4-2-3-1 or 4-1-2-3 at times but, as was usually the case with Brazil, most
players ​ save the two centre-backs and the sitting
midfielder popped up wherever momentum took them.
Nonetheless, Aimee Jacquet’s France overwhelmed
Brazil in the final, with Zidane proving his status as one of the world’s finest players, perhaps ever.
France’s system was designed to make the most of an attacking talent without
compromising defence and it worked marvellously.
Football was finding that blending defence and attack, rather than privileging
one or the other, was the way to win.