Good day. In this video I’ll be talking about the Chinese perspective on the American M142 HIMARS,
or the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, produced by Lockheed Martin. It is a light
multiple rocket launcher developed for the US Army capable of using a range of guided
projectiles. These include the standard guided multiple launch rocket system (the GMLRS),
the ATACMS tactical ballistic missile, and the newest precision strike missile,
among other weapons. The HIMARS is arguably the most symbolic poster child of Western military aid
to Ukraine. The Collective West has sent scores of military equipment to Ukraine, with a wide range
of different types, but the HIMARS has enjoyed the most media coverage, owing to its effectiveness
in striking Russian logistics, weapon stockpiles and troop concentration way behind the frontlines.
The war in Ukraine is being studied by militaries around the world, from the employment of anti-ship
missiles to the efficacy of electronic warfare. The Chinese military is an especially keen
learner of the lessons of the War in Ukraine, in part because of the real combat experience
these lessons are based upon, and partly because China has imported Russian equipment in the past,
and have modified or vastly improved upon Russian equipment for their own use. As the War in Ukraine
is turning increasingly to Russia’s favour, the Chinese are trying to better understand
how these weapons should and should not be used on the battlefield. The Chinese have also taken
particular interest in the performance of key Western weapons, and this includes the HIMARS.
American strategists have long believed that the weapon could hold a major role in a war against
China, for example by dispersing such long-range assets across the many islands in the Western
Pacific. For their part, Chinese strategists have been studying such long-range mobile rocket
systems, and have developed similar systems. The Chinese have also been researching methods
to counter and to defeat the US HIMARS. The content of this video is based on a
great article in the Diplomat, written by Lyle Goldstein. I think in the West, and especially in
the United States, you don’t really find great analysis on the Chinese military. Much of the
information they use are either outdated or simply misinformed. However, Lyle Goldstein is a great
commentator I hold in very high regard. He was a research professor at the US Naval War College for
twenty years. He understands the Chinese language and therefore is able to draw on primary sources
in Chinese. Possibly because he has a better understanding of the PLA than most of his peers,
unlike many in the West he cautions against underestimating Chinese military power. Anyway,
Lyle Goldstein is a top-tier source. In his article, Lyle referenced a piece
of research published in a military technology journal funded by the China State Shipbuilding
Corporation, which is the primary builder of PLAN warships. The article is simply titled:
“Countering HIMARS”. There are key lessons in there from the War in Ukraine for the PLA to
respond to the American mobile rocket artillery. In the article, Chinese analysts acknowledged the
big impact of the HIMARS on the war in Ukraine. According to them quote “The HIMARS imported
from the U.S. frequently attacked ammunition depots, logistics centres, and command posts
in the Russian rear, and have had a definite impact on the battlefield situation” Unquote.
While the HIMARS has been mostly employed to strike at Russian logistics and communications,
it has also been used against formations of Russian troops. The HIMARS have been
used against staging points for Russian assaults, and to break up concentrations of Russian troops,
inflicting heavy casualties in the process. The HIMARS provides Ukraine with the long range and
the firepower to strike deep behind the Russian frontlines. According to Lyle,
Chinese thinking on the future of combat places a great emphasis on non-contact warfare, another
words long-range fire combat employs long-range fires from assets way behind the contact lines.
According to the research article: “The future of warfare is expanding in the domains of information
and intelligence. Conventional standard munitions can no longer meet the needs of warfare.” unquote
Another key advantage of the HIMARS is a high level of survivability on the battlefield,
which is made possible by its high mobility. According to the Chinese researcher: “The HIMARS
rely on high-speed mobility to carry out strikes and then stay protected through concealment on
the battlefield…. HIMARS has the characteristics of being highly efficient for conventional combat
as well as guerrilla warfare”. Clearly, the Chinese are very much aware of the hit and run
tactics of the HIMARS, and how this translates directly into the concealment of its location
and survivability, particularly after firing. In the context of a conflict in the Western
Pacific, the Chinese are very interested in a scenario where the HIMARS is deployed on
the island of Taiwan itself. This is the location where China considers such systems to potentially
pose the greatest threat. On a basic level, Taiwan’s geography involves a large plain on the
western side of the island facing the mainland, with a mountain range running through the middle,
and a narrow strip of land to the east, just before the Pacific Ocean. Based on this geography,
it is likely for the HIMARS to either be deployed in the western plains and in designated hiding
spots. I think it’s also possible, in fact likely, for HIMARS to be deployed inside the mountains, on
the Western side, and within the many caverns and tunnels. Inside these caverns, the HIMARS should
be much better defended against counter-battery fire by the PLA. From these locations on Taiwan,
the HIMARS can be used to strike into the coastal provinces of China. They can target command and
control sites and logistics centres supporting the landing on Taiwan. In fact, HIMARS can directly
attack the PLA’s landing force as well, even well after they have managed to secure a beachhead.
In fact, in the ensuing land warfare, the HIMARS will continue to play a critical role in slowing
and potentially reversing the PLA advance. The furthest range of HIMARS can cover up to
300 kilometres inland of China. This refers to the new Precision Strike Missile variant.
The focus on rear areas, strikes on landing forces, and command and control sites point
to the possibility that HIMARS could be used pre-emptively, before an assault even commences.
It is possible for Taiwan to launch an attack with HIMARS against the People’s Liberation Army,
while is still being assembled and concentrated in the Fujian province. The scale of such an
operation would be virtually impossible to conceal, giving Taiwan the option of
a pre-emptive strike using long-range fires like the HIMARS. This would be the moment when Chinese
forces might be more vulnerable to attacks as they are being mobilized to embarkation points
along the coast. This of course assumes that the US would be supplying Taiwan with the longer-range
HIMARS ammunition, the Precision Strike Missile variant, which in reality the US may withhold
owing to concerns around escalation. But let’s assume that the US does supply Taiwan with such
long-range munitions – how would the PLA respond? While the PLA regards the HIMARS as a formidable
threat, they’re far from invincible, and can in fact be countered with the right strategy.
The Chinese assessment noted that “although HIMARS has great advantages, it is not invulnerable.” The
most effective method for the PLA to respond is through active attacks. Air supremacy is
crucial for this strategy, allowing the PLA Air Force to locate, track and attack the HIMARS
launchers essentially at will. Air supremacy is hugely beneficial for gathering intelligence,
identifying enemy assets, striking the target, and restricting the mobility of the opponent, thereby
forcing the opponent into a passive position. It is worth noting that basically everyone
agrees that China would rapidly establish air superiority, if not air supremacy,
in any attack on Taiwan. Chinese strategists certainly believe so, and with good reasons,
such the wide availability of fifth generation fighters for the PLAAF compared to a small
number of fourth generation fighters fielded by Taiwan. US intelligence assessments leaked by a US
National Guard member, and seen by the Washington Post, reveal that only about half of Taiwan
aircraft are capable of effectively engaging the PLAAF, and that moving Taiwanese aircraft
into shelters could take up to a week, leaving them vulnerable to missile strikes. As such,
the Pentagon concluded that the Chinese Air Force would find it far easier to establish
air superiority over Taiwan, than the Russian Air Force over Ukraine. With the sky under their
control, the PLAAF would be able to detect and locate HIMARS, strike at them and destroy them
before they can fire a shot. The HIMARS’ main strength is the capacity to fire quickly and then
reposition to stay hidden. Taking advantage of air supremacy, the PLAAF can send in a large number of
drones to carry out large-scale reconnaissance to find the rocket launchers. The Chinese researchers
have learned from the Russian tactic in Ukraine around using drones. The Russians have deployed a
large number of drones and other forces to carry out three-dimensional reconnaissance, locate
the Ukrainian army’s HIMARS, understand their movements, and launch fighter-bombers to execute
strikes. And of course, Taiwan is far smaller than Ukraine, so it could actually be more difficult
for HIMARS to hide in Taiwan compared to Ukraine. A lot of emphasis is placed on electronic warfare
as the main defensive measure against the HIMARS. Starting around mid-2023, the Russian forces have
begun improving their electronic countermeasures in the war in Ukraine. The Russians have been
using electronic jammers to target the guidance system of Western guided weapons,
as well as to counter Ukrainian drones, rendering many of them ineffective. Russian electronic
warfare caused Western missiles to miss their targets, including the HIMARS. The Ukrainians
and Americans responded by tweaking the HIMARS software to counter the Russian jamming efforts,
but the Russians responded in turn by improving their jamming techniques. Similarly,
the Chinese researchers hope to take advantage of electronic warfare to defend against attacks
by the HIMARS in a Western Pacific conflict. The analysis placed an additional emphasis not only
on jamming and intercepting guided munitions, but also on interfering with the targeting
intelligence that provides targeting information to the HIMARS. Another method is to interfere with
the communication system, the command-and-control system, and the decision-makers that control
the HIMARS. In turn, this would render the mobile rocket launcher essentially useless,
even if they remain physically intact. The Chinese assessment assumes that
the Taiwanese operators of these weapons would receive intelligence from US assets, for example
from their airborne early warning systems. This has been the case for Ukrainian forces in their
fight against Russia, so it seems only logical for Taiwan to receive the same support from US assets,
regardless of whether the US decides to join the fight. As far as the PLA is concerned,
this problem could have a simple solution. In the case where the US forces stay out of the fight,
final victory is basically a certainty, regardless of how successful the HIMARS could be. In that
situation, electronic warfare could be one way to disable US intelligence assets without
running the risk of broadening the war. In a situation where the Americans have decided to
fight and possibly die for Taiwan, well then, their intelligence assets could be targeted
with lethal force without hesitation. In this video, we have examined a range
of different ways Chinese military thinkers have derived to counter the American HIMARS,
in a western Pacific conflict, namely one over Taiwan. The most important of these
tactics include active attacks on the HIMARS themselves, chiefly by leveraging the air
supremacy the PLAAF is widely expected to achieve. When playing defence, a combination of electronic
countermeasures and traditional hard-kill measures based on air defence missiles seem
to hold the best chance of stopping an attack by HIMARS. That will be all, see you next time.