As we have reported Russia's President Vladimir Putin doubled down
on his war in Ukraine, ordering Russia's first mobilization since
World War two calling up hundreds of thousands of reserves and retired
fighters. He said more manpower is needed to win a war not just against
Ukraine. But against its Western backers. I'm gonna vase has more
That's right. Judy, the call up of Russia's 300,000 reservists, a
referendum in Russian occupied regions of Ukraine on joining Russia
and a stark warning from Vladimir Putin to the West that he is not
bluffing when he talks about being ready to use nuclear weapons.
It has been an eventful for boating day. So to understand what all
of this means at this juncture in the war, both on the battlefield
and in Russia, we turn to Natalia Bokova, Russia fellow at the Institute
for the Study of War and author of the book How We
We got here with Russia, the Kremlin's worldview. Natalia, Welcome
to the news hour. Thank you for being here. So people are looking
at this decision. Putin's order of partial mobilization order and
calling it an act of desperation. What do you think? Do you see it
that way?
Let's be clear The reason why Vladimir Putin has made the decision
is because Russian forces are not accomplishing their objectives
in Ukraine. Putin has invaded Ukraine in February with insufficient
force, which he had them exhausted at pursuit of very limited gains.
His efforts to replenish that force through other means shorter for
mobilizations have not produced. The outcome here is expected
So this is his way to reconcile the gap between between his unchanged,
intent to control all Ukraine and Russia's rapidly degrading capability
to do so. Who are these reservists? So what do we know about them
and their skill level? And what kind of a difference could they make
in the war? Yes, I think the impact of this decision will not reconcile
help reconcile the gap.
Between the intent and capability. We will know the full impact of
this decision in months to come. But I think Russia will face a number
of challenges in integrating these forces. The first one is quantity.
Desertion will be an issue. We know that many Russians support the
war rhetorically, but they're not willing to fight in it. Additionally,
I think Russians will face challenges and equipping
Integrating this forces, training them and also capacity to deploy
them, which requires officer cadre and increasingly diminishing
resource in the Russian military. I think equipment is also going
to be a challenge. Russia has used some of its best forces and equipment
already in this fight and the short comments of Russia's defense
industrial base increasingly a problem and as long as it actually
is, the West keeps and expands the export control.
On electronic
equipment, Russian forces and reproducing advanced capabilities militarily
would be an increasing challenge. They're seeing the impact of some
of those sanctions when it comes to defense production as well. But
what about the impact back home in Russia? As you mentioned, Russians
may support it
in invoice only not necessarily being willing to fight in the war?
Could this decision further erode support for the war back home?
I think Vladimir Putin the value proposition to his people for many
years has been a promise of great Russia and this value proposition
is being fundamentally challenged now in large part by setbacks of
Russians military in Ukraine.
Um, I think he's increasingly facing a challenge and need to reconcile
reconcilable objectives on one side, keeping up this promise of great
Russia.
Eroding capability to deliver on it, but also unwillingness of Russian
people to fight for this vision.
Do you think there's concern among Russian people that this could
lead to a full mobilization? Are we seeing that on the ground? Yes,
I think so. And we've seen Russian man trying to flee the country
now and some of the largest search on the Internet for how to essentially
escape mobilization. So yes, I think it's an increasing concern.
There was in his remarks that not so veiled nuclear threat as well.
And you just heard President Duda of Poland. They're saying no one
knows what President Putin will do. Let's be clear. They have never
used a nuclear weapon before.
For But at this point in a war a war that's now dragged on much longer
than anyone, including Vladimir Putin thought
Explaining as you have where the landscape is. Are we closer to Putin,
potentially making that kind of decision either on a nuclear strike
on a NATO nation or a tactical strike on Ukraine? I think the strike
on NATO nation is highly unlikely. I think we cannot rule out Putin's
use of a tactical nuke in Ukraine. However, there are two really
important points here.
One. Ukraine has been taken that risk since the day chose to push
back on Russia in this war and its Ukraine's and Ukraine's decision
only whether to continue running that risk so far, they have because
the alternative for many is worse. It's a it's a zoom, um and we've
seen what it looks like, I think. Secondly, um there is a question
of what such as drug would accomplish.
And my assessment, it was unlikely to break Ukraine's will to fight,
which is one of the two key centers of gravity of this war together
with the Western support
What does all this mean for Vladimir Putin back home? Does this make
him the seven month war? Now having to call up 300,000 reservists?
Does this make him more politically vulnerable? I think he's not
imminently vulnerable, but he's more vulnerable. That has been in
years precisely because his value proposition is being challenged.
However, um we will see how he will react. He has been
Proven to be able to come protest for years. But one more constrained
he faces now is that a lot of his suppression apparatus is being
deployed in Ukraine, such as Rose Guardia, which is national guard,
so he is facing increasing limitation in that regard as well. What
are you watching in these next few days to see how those remarks
play out on the ground?
We're watching the reaction of Russian people to the mobilization.
But I think the most important things to watch will come in month.
Not in days and specifically how Russia will integrate this forest
how it will train it and what effect it will eventually producing
the battlefield. Which I do not think we will see until 2023 Natalia
Bokova, Russia research fellow from the Institute for the Study of