Last season, Tony Pulis’ West Bromwich Albion achieved 16 assists from set pieces, the most
in the Premier League and the highest percentage of goals scored from set pieces as
opposed to by other means in the league.
Salomon Rondon was West Brom’s top scorer, with eight goals, but hot on his heels was
veteran centre-back Gareth McAuley, who scored six, and right-back Craig Dawson chipped
in with four.
Powerful in the air, West Brom had 35 headed shots on target, with only Arsenal
and Crystal Palace managing more, with 36 each; West Brom also scored 16 headed goals,
bettered only by Arsenal’s 17.
Not all these goals came from set pieces, but they show that
West Brom’s attack was geared to finishing headed chances.
West Brom tended to line-up in a 4-2-3-1, occasionally using a 4-1-4-1 as well, which
was effectively just a deeper version of the same
formation.
Wide men Matt Phillips, Chris Brunt (sometimes from full-back) and Nacer Chadli all posed
a significant threat getting forwards.
Unusually for Premier League teams, West Bromwich Albion tended not to push their full-backs
up in open play, instead creating two blocks, a
defensive six and an attacking four, playing a lot in their own half for solidity and looking
to launch long balls to the wings.
This had two effects.
Firstly, it afforded Phillips especially the chance to cross for Rondon or
for James Morrison, who also chipped in with a number of goals and acted as something of
a second, but much deeper-lying, striker.
Secondly, this rapid, long ball attack played the West Brom wingers in deep into opposition
territory, and encouraged full-backs to push onto the them and close them down, which
gave West Brom opportunities to force corners.
And from these, the Baggies were deadly.
But how?
The numbers show that West Brom only won 159 corners, the joint third lowest
total in the league.
They were the joint second best for the percentage of successful corners,
though.
West Brom’s corner routines were largely unremarkable – what they were, though, was
consistent and well-thought out.
The most successful used an in-swinging delivery.
Typically, West Brom would start with a player or two
lingering deep on the edge of the box, and two
or three players in the six yard box.
As the corner came in, swinging from out to in at the near post area, the players in the
six yard box would either run towards the flight
of the ball or stay and jostle the goalkeeper.
The player or two on the edge of the box would run in a curve, away from the flight of the
ball, which would pass over the decoy runners who had drawn the defenders towards them
and the flight of the ball.
They could then pop up, either unmarked, or with a head-start in
terms of momentum on ant defender who might have noticed their run.
The key point here is that West Brom exploited teams’ tendency to flood defenders towards
the flight of the ball on in-swinging corners, knowing that at least one player would find
a clear path to the area in which the ball would
drop, close to the keeper.
In another routine, West Brom deployed as many as three or four runners on the edge
of the box, in addition to almost always having a
decoy runner at the near post.
These runners would peel off in different directions, the outer two on curving runs
away from the penalty spot, the middle one running
directly towards the ‘keeper.
One of these players would often check their run, while the decoy runner and the other
two continued, creating a stop/start pattern that
confused the marking side.
West Brom have powerful headers of the ball, tall players who commit to attacking the ball,
but the combination of in-swinging corners, using Salomon Rondon as a decoy runner
towards the ball, and understanding that attacking man or zonal marking differently is
effective was crucial to their set piece success.
While the Baggies could not generate too many chances from open play, or win too many
corners, they maximised the chances from the corners they did win through a combination
of having the right players and coaching them effectively.
Given how many other teams wasted significantly more corners, it shows
how canny Tony Pulis is at working with the resources he has.