Around the world, there are many territories vying for indepen dence and international recognition.
Of these, few would appear to have a stronger claim to international acceptance as Somaliland,
which seceded from Somalia in 1991.
By all accounts, it meets all the main criteria for statehood.
It also enjoys considerable international sympathy.
And yet, after three decades, it remains completely unrecognised.
In this video, I'm going to take a look at why it has faced such an uphill battle
to gain formal international acceptance and consider whether this could change.
[MUSIC]
Hello. My name is James Ker-Lindsay.
Welcome to 'Independent Thinking'.
A channel dedicated to international relations, statehood, independence and the origins of countries.
Somaliland has emerged as one of the most interesting cases of secession in modern international politics.
Lying in the Horn of Africa, on the coast of the Gulf of Aden,
it has effectively existed as a fully independent entity for the past 30 years.
And yet, while it maintains strong relations with a number of countries,
all its efforts to persuade the international community to recognise it have failed.
So, why has it faced such a struggle to be accepted?
The territory first emerged in the late 19th century, when the area fell under British colonial rule
- becoming the British Somaliland Protectorate, in 1884.
This set it apart from neighbouring Italian Somaliland, to the east and the south.
As Britain retreated from its empire, the decision was made to grant the territory independence.
And, on 26 June 1960, the State of Somaliland came into existence.
It was immediately recognised by over 30 countries, including the United Kingdom.
However, the new country was short-lived.
Just days later, on 1 July 1960, the Italian administered Trust Territory of Somaliland became independent
and the two countries officially merged to form the Somali Republic.
Despite the initial jubilation at unification, it quickly became an unhappy relationship.
In 1961, a new constitution was passed - despite having been opposed by Somaliland voters -
that effectively downgraded Somaliland by making it an autonomous province of the Republic.
In the years that followed, this resentment grew as Somaliland became increasingly marginalised
by the Somali central government, in Mogadishu.
This sense of alienation increased after Somalia fell under the dictatorial rule of General Siad Barre,
following a coup, in 1969.
In the late 1980s, the central government viciously put down an uprising in Somaliland,
resulting the deaths of many tens of thousands and the heavy bombing of the province's capital, Hargeisa.
In January 1991, Barre finally was overthrown by clan forces from across the country, including Somaliland.
However, rather than usher in a new period of stability, it instead led to a civil war in the south of the country.
As the rest of Somalia descended into conflict and anarchy following the collapse
of the central government in Mogadishu, Somaliland seized its opportunity to break away.
On 18 May 1991, it unilaterally declared independence
- or, as the leaders in Somaliland would say, it reclaimed its independence.
In the three decades since it seceded from Somalia, Somaliland has managed to consolidate its position.
So-much-so that it is now widely accepted that it meets the criteria for statehood
laid down by the Montevideo Convention.
For a start, it has a defined territory.
However, it's worth pointing out that the situation is complicated by an ongoing boundary dispute
with neighbouring Puntland - an autonomous province of Somalia to its east.
On top of this, a secessionist movement has emerged in eastern Somaliland that seeks to break away
and unite with Somalia - albeit as a separate entity from Puntland
Notwithstanding this rather confusing situation,
Somaliland nevertheless meets the territorial requirements for statehood.
Secondly, it also clearly has a settled population.
According to most recent estimates, the current population of Somaliland is in the region
of three and a half to four million people.
Thirdly, it has a government.
Indeed, this is one of its key selling points.
In stark contrast to the political chaos that has existed in Somalia for much of the past thirty years,
Somaliland has long been a bastion of calm and stability.
Crucially, it's government is also fully independent.
There's no suspicion that it's merely a proxy for another power.
On the fourth criteria, the ability to enter into relations with other states, the situation is especially interesting.
Somaliland enjoys greater international acceptance than many other wholly unrecognised states.
As well as enjoying good relations with its neighbours,
it has established representative offices in the United States,
as well as a number of European and African countries
- although it has to be stressed that these actually have no formal diplomatic status.
Interestingly, it has particularly close ties to Britain.
As well as providing aid to Somaliland, British officials often meet with Somaliland leaders
- both in London and in Hargeisa.
Perhaps the most significance of these meetings came in January 2019, when Gavin Williamson,
the then British Defence Secretary, paid an official visit to Somaliland and met with the President,
the Foreign and Defence Ministers, as well as senior members of the Somaliland Armed Forces.
However, balanced against this, London continues to insist that it does in fact recognise
the territorial integrity of Somalia.
On top of all this, Somaliland also maintains many of the other trappings of statehood,
including its own flag, its own currency and, of course, its own Armed Forces.
It even enjoys direct flights to neighbouring countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya and even Dubai
- making actually relatively accessible.
So, why hasn't it been recognised?
In truth, and somewhat paradoxically, it's actually both easy and hard to explain.
One thing that's worth highlighting from the start is that its previous independence actually
tends to have little bearing on the discussion in any formal sense.
Under international law, a territory that voluntarily gives up its independence to join another country,
doesn't in fact have a right to reclaim its statehood at will.
I'll take a look at this important point
- which has impact on all sorts of other disputes, including Scotland and even Texas - in a future video.
In the meantime, to this end, even though it has become an important moral argument that is heavily pressed by
Somaliland leaders, its previous independence doesn't in fact carry as much weight as many would want.
That said, in other ways, the traditional rules concerning secession don't quite seem to apply to Somaliland
in the same way that they do elsewhere.
Somaliland hasn't really faced the opprobrium usually reserved the unilateral secession
in international politics.
Maybe this is because it was once an independent country, and isn't actually a case
of invasion and occupation by an external actor - as is the case in many other instances.
Indeed, it's long been tacitly understood that, for a variety of reasons,
it does seem to amount to a rather special case.
This was made clear when, in 2005, the African Union sent a fact-finding mission to Somaliland.
In its final report, the mission recommended recognition.
Highlighting steps that the country had taken towards becoming a "modern state",
it noted that Somaliland's situation was "unique and self-justified in African political history",
therefore the case "should not be linked to the notion of opening a Pandora's box".
This was highly significant as it seemed to offer Somaliland a path
to eventual full international recognition - at least at the time.
The view emerged that if the African Union was willing to accept Somaliland's independence,
then others would follow suit.
However, despite this steer from the African Union's fact-finding mission,
the countries of Africa were unable to reach a consensus on the issue.
As a result, Somaliland remained unrecognized in years that followed.
So, a decade and a half later, is there still a chance for it to be recognized?
On balance, it would seem not - at least not anytime soon.
On the one hand, it doesn't seem that much has changed in its favour.
Clearly, the long-standing nervousness about redrawing borders in Africa remains an issue
- despite the view in the report that it wouldn't open up a precedent.
Meanwhile, in other ways, things have actually worked against Somaliland.
Many Western countries, including the United Kingdom, will no doubt be worried about the effects
of independence on the significant efforts that have been made since 2012 to stabilise and rebuild Somalia.
There's quite clearly a fear in many quarters that, if Somaliland is allowed to go its own way,
other parts of the country will try to follow.
This fracturing could make tackling long-standing problems of warlordism, terrorist groups
and piracy in Somalia even more difficult.
Indeed, in recent years, there have been efforts to try to bring the sides into formal peace talks.
This seems likely to continue into the future.
And while there is the prospect of talks, even if they are unlikely to reach a mutually acceptable settlement,
few countries will want to prejudice the outcome by taking a decision on recognition.
As a counter-argument, leaders in Somaliland argue that other geopolitical factors are now working in their favour
in terms of recognition.
For example, there's increasing interest in their port facilities
- including reports that Russia wants to establish a naval base there.
While this might have an effect in the future, it's very much in the realm of speculation for now.
Somaliland is a fascinating case.
All things considered, it sits in a strange grey zone when it comes to secession.
Leaving aside its previous existence as an independent state,
which doesn't officially have a bearing on its claim to independence,
but does nevertheless seem to shape perceptions about its case,
it most certainly meets the four conditions for statehood.
It is a clearly defined territory.
It has a settled population.
It has a government - and one that is demonstrably independent.
And, lastly, it has a proven capacity to enter into relations with other states.
For all these reasons, one doesn't detect the same sort of hostility towards independence for Somaliland
as exists in other cases of secession.
Indeed, many seem to tacitly understand its case for statehood
and probably sympathise with it given the state of the rest of Somalia.
As things stand, it seems to be held back by a combination of African concern about secession
and by wider Western concern about Somalia's stability.
Ultimately, Somaliland's biggest problem has not been strong opposition to its existence
as an independent state
- as is the case in many other examples of secession.
Instead, as is highlighted by its engagement with the outside world, its real problem has been
international concern about the implications of formally recognizing that independence.
If you found that interesting, here are some other videos on other disputes that you might find interesting.
And please do 'Like', 'Subscribe' and 'Share' the video if you enjoyed it as it does help the channel.
Many thanks for watching and see you again soon.
[MUSIC]