I am delighted so be here today
to launch Professor Michael Wesley's book
Restless Continent: Wealth, Rivalry and Asia's New Geopolitics.
As you can see, it's a very well-thumbed work already.
It is a timely work.
It is thoughtful and measured
and it's a contribution to the public discourse
on the geopolitics of the shift from West to East,
from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
And Michael, what you've created in this book
is a very approachable readily understandable guide
for the major challenges of our time and our region.
It poses questions on where we go from here in the period ahead.
And that's no small task.
In the space of less than 200 pages,
you traverse five centuries of history and thousands of kilometres
of highly diverse human cultural geography.
This is a critically important story.
And one that is not as well understood as it should be.
Michael, you sketch out the modern history
that is critical to understanding the world we live in today
and the profound challenges faced by all of us in the Indian Ocean -
Asia-Pacific region.
Your story starts at the dawn of the European colonial age.
And you lightly and seamlessly bring the reader forward,
all the way to the second decade of the 21st century.
Asia's extraordinary industrialization and transformation
is your central topic.
And it's the critical backdrop to so much of what will happen
in the century ahead.
What strikes me most is the paradox you describe of increasing wealth
and economic interdependence on the one hand,
and a strategic claustrophobia, fear, and rivalry on the other.
To quote you,
"The growing wealth and assertiveness of Asia's states creates a power paradox.
The more powerful countries become more vulnerable, they fear.
Fears of encirclement are driving an escalating arms race
across the continent leading to a shift in the latent structure of force
that underpins the continent's rules and institutions,
a shift that is playing out across two different geographic settings."
I see the origins of what you describe in the words of Richard Nixon,
which is so superbly set out in the peace dividends chapter.
This is during a 1969 visit to the American base in Guam.
And you've taken Nixon's quote where he says,
"As we look at Asia, it poses, over the long haul,
the greatest threat to the peace of the world.
And for that reason United States should continue to play a significant role.
It also poses the greatest hope for progress in the world,
progress in the world because of the ability of the people,
the resources physically that are available in this part of the world."
And another point that has struck me,
as highlighted in your book,
is the fact that Indo-pacific countries
like China, Japan, India, and Indonesia,
and all of the nations in between,
don't arrive at this moment in history,
at this vast growth of regional, economic, and strategic power,
without significant historical and cultural baggage.
You talk about baggage still being unpacked from the colonial age,
and perhaps more significantly,
the ancient Indo-pacific cultural frictions
that still simmer under the surface of all the major Asian relationships.
And two lines I particularly liked;
page 110,
"Historical scripts heavily influence how contemporary events are interpreted."
And then later,
"Asia's complex ethnic and religious mosaics are the result
of centuries of social sedimentation
left behind by the tides of conflict, commerce, and colonialisation."
And then in another chapter,
"History, hierarchy, and culture mixed with rapid economic development
combined make Asia's States restless souls.
The never healing wounds of Western subjugation
plus the need to build cohesion among and attachment of diverse societies
to their new states drive them to be culturally and politically assertive
and often prickly about what they perceive
to be others presumptions."
For a nation like Australia,
these are very important realizations
in terms of how we engage the Indo-pacific
and how we position ourselves in it.
Since becoming Foreign Minister,
I've sought to raise awareness of the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape
in which Australia is forging its future.
It is a foreign policy priority for us.
And we have focused so much of our foreign policy assets, resources,
and interests on the Indo-pacific.
A new Colombo Plan, for example,
will play a significant role in this.
And I'm delighted to note that by the end of next year,
10,000 Australian undergraduates will have been funded to live, study,
and work in our region,
in 38 countries across the Indian Ocean - Asia-Pacific.
Economic power has shifted dramatically to this region.
And despite the inevitable ups and downs in economic strength
as we've seen in recent months,
the momentum will continue this way in coming decades.
And your story helps explain why.
It also sets out the strategic challenges we face as a result.
As newly powerful Indo-Pacific nations renegotiate their position
in the region, in their relationships with the other states,
it is inevitable that tensions and misunderstandings will arise.
Historical geostrategic frictions are real.
On a global scale, our time is characterized
by a much greater number of international players than used to be the case.
As well as the rise of highly influential non state actors,
a fact that makes it harder to achieve consensus
on issues of international concern.
And as you demonstrate so clearly in your book,
not all of those players come at our common challenges
from the same perspectives.
Each of these players has their own set of perspectives
of seeing the world.
Indeed, often there are vastly different value systems at play.
It's complex, challenging, fraught.
But your book is not gloomy or pessimistic.
Your conclusion is that notwithstanding these growing pressures,
we have cause to be hopeful that we can, in the main,
stay the course of peace and prosperity.
One of the chief reasons you identify for that
is the great degree of economic interdependency
that is the hallmark of our time.
And I agree with the proposition that while economic interdependency
doesn't obviate the prospect of war,
it does make it a more expensive proposition.
That's partly why I've advocated for economic diplomacy.
Just as traditional diplomacy has promoted peace and stability,
economic diplomacy promotes peace, stability, and prosperity.
And it's why we continue to look at innovative ways
for taking forward our diplomatic objectives
and for building flexible and responsive regional architecture.
Building the ties of trade, investment, cross-border business relationships,
and pursuing economic growth has helped us build a sense of regionalism
over the past few decades.
And it will help us weather the storms of strategic rivalry and competition.
From Australia's perspective,
this is a vital part of the work of key institutions
like these the East Asia Summit.
With the glue of ASEAN,
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations behind it
the East Asia Summit is a critical forum
that should allow us to discuss and resolve differences of opinion or approach
that if left unresolved,
might lead the nations of our region astray.
As Foreign Minister I've also focused on the Indian Ocean Rim Association
the 20 member states whose shores are lapped by the vast Indian Ocean.
IORA stands it as a valuable mechanism
for helping nations of the Indian Ocean
come to common understandings.
Michael, in your current role as Professor of International Affairs
and director of the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs
at the Australian National University,
you are exquisitely placed to make the observations contained here.
In launching your book today,
I thank you for writing it
because it makes a valuable contribution
and an accessible highly readable contribution
to a very important discourse on peace and development in our region
and ongoing prosperity and stability.
It is a worthwhile contribution.
I urge you all to read it
and I have great pleasure and deep personal delight
at launching Restless Continent:
Wealth, Rivalry and Asia's New Geopolitics by Michael Wesley.
Thank you.
Michael.
[applause]
(Michael Wesley) Minister.
Wow!
Thank you.
Thank you for an incredibly generous launch
and you're incredibly generous remarks about my book.
Can I also thank you for your support and encouragement of me
over many years,
over the many years we've known each other?
And furthermore, as you said,
the position that I hold at the Australian National University
has been incredibly rewarding,
mainly for the fact that under your leadership,
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
our foreign policy institutions have been open,
your emphasis on innovation and ideas.
The weekly interaction that we have with officers from your department
and very generous support that we get from your department as well
makes it an absolute joy to be working at the ANU on international affairs.
Can also I thank, while I have the floor,
Chris Feik my publisher from Black Inc. Books?
Chris must be the most patient publisher in the world.
I think I missed about three or four deadlines, Chris.
But he stuck with me.
And I'm delighted he did so.
Can I also thank my family who are here today as well as my colleagues and friends,
my wonderful colleagues at the Australian National University,
many of whom would recognize some of the arguments in the book?
So let me just say a few words about the book if I might.
Why did I write the book?
Why did I think it was a good idea to write a book about the future of Asia?
Well one of the reasons was that I had suspected for some time in Australia
that when people use the word Asia people talked about,
were really talking about China.
And the idea of this book is to suggest that Asia is about more than just China.
It's about much more than just China.
And it's about much more than just China versus the United States.
It's really about,
this book is really about what's happening on the world's central continent,
the biggest continent, 60% of the world's population,
and certainly going to be the biggest economic entity in continent size.
As the Minister says,
"It is about what happens when really two stabilizing conditions have been lifted;
firstly the economic underdevelopment of the continent of Asia,
and secondly when the overwhelming US military
and economic power position in Asia starts to be eroded by rising powers.
I think what it leads to is that many of the assumptions
on which we base our understandings of international relations
need to be challenged
because this is a genuinely new era we're going into.
It's an era in which we have to start to get rid of our assumptions
that non-Western states,
with their own power and wealth,
will calculate, act, as Western states have done in the past.
That, with two abiding preoccupations,
wealth and mutual mistrust and rivalry,
Asia's states will settle into understandable patterns.
As I argue in the book,
both war, to lance the rivalries that we're seeing,
and political integration to build on economic integration,
are not really likely options.
So the book talks about how rivalry in the midst of interdependence,
or "rivalrous interdependence," as I call it,
will play out in the,
is really the key to Asia's future and the world's.
The other contention I make in the book is that Asia,
from the Pacific to the Mediterranean,
from the Arctic Ocean to the Indian Ocean,
can no longer be neatly divided up and dealt with in in smaller packages.
I think we need to be attentive to the consequential connections
that are growing across Asia and drawing it together.
Energy, infrastructure, development,
religious fundamentalism, strategic partnerships,
to list just a few.
I think this matters because to understand and respond effectively
to what's happening in any one part,
will require understanding its linkages elsewhere in the continent.
Ladies and gentlemen I hope you enjoy the book.
Minister, once again, thank you for your kind words.