There has been talk for months now of when the Ukrainian counter-offensive will start,
whether it’s already begun, where it will take place, what forces Ukraine will need to punch
through the Russian defenses, whether they have enough tanks and artillery to last for
the entire offensive, and whether the offensive will ultimately be successful. Part of the reason
there’s so much speculation is because the Ukrainian government and its military have
taken extraordinary measures to keep their plans and their military’s disposition quiet,
so as not to tip off the Russians as to their plans and avenues of attack.
One of the problems with the impending offensive is the high expectation of success that many
observers have. Last September’s stunningly successful drives east of Kherson and south
into Kharkiv took so much ground so quickly that many people expect the same lightning-fast results
for the upcoming offensive. But this time, the Russians have been preparing their defenses for
more than six months, they’ve brought in many more troops and artillery, and are supported by
better trained and equipped support forces. Some military analysts in the West doubt that Ukraine
can retake all their occupied terrain before the wet weather of Fall and Winter sets in.
But those doubts have persisted around Ukraine’s mere ability to defend themselves against the
Russian invasion since the opening stages of the invasion. Three months into the war,
historians Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage argued that “a full-scale Ukrainian military
defeat of Russia, including the retaking of Crimea, verges on fantasy.” Thankfully,
they and most other Western analysts were wrong about the will for the Ukrainian population to
resist Russian occupation, and overlooked both the amount of support NATO and the US would provide,
as well as overestimating the strength and coordination of the Russian invaders.
But as Ukraine’s counter-offensive begins to take shape, there are still quite a few questions that
remain to be answered. The first, oddly enough, is whether the counter-offensive has actually begun.
The Three Conditions for the Counteroffensive to Begin
Russian president Vladimir Putin has no doubts: he stated publicly on June 9th
that he believed the offensive had begun in earnest. Other commentators pointed
to June 4th as the date when Ukrainian forces began their attacks in earnest,
which explains why two days later, Russian forces blew up the Kakhovka Dam on the Dnipro River,
in order to widen the river downstream. That in turn would allow Russia to pull troops
from that region and reinforce other areas where the attacks were more likely to occur.
Many analysts have been watching for certain key requirements to determine whether Ukraine
felt comfortable enough to launch their major counterattacks. Retired US Lt-Gen Ben
Hodges wrote in an article for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) on June 11th,
“When we see two or three (Ukrainian) brigades (around 500-750 armored vehicles) focused on a
narrow front, it will then be possible to say that the main attack has probably started,
and where it’s happening.” Until then, Hodges says, what we’re seeing are initial probing
efforts by Ukraine with minimal forces—a few tanks here, a dozen or less IFVs
like the US Bradley over there—rather than the full brunt of a major attack.
The Ukrainian military commander-in-chief, General Valerii Zaluzhny, has been hailed as
a hero for coordinating the defense of Kyiv in the early days of the war. Since then,
he’s been tasked with coordinating all of Ukraine’s military forces,
and is the man who will make the decision on when and where to commit Ukraine’s strategic reserves
for any successful attack. General Hodges in his June 11th article said there were likely
three overall preconditions that would need to be met before Zaluzhny would give the green light:
- Has Ukraine gathered enough combat brigades, primarily armored brigades with sufficient
numbers of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, supported by engineers, artillery,
and air defense units, along with the extensive logistical support to keep them all functioning?
Will these forces be able to punch through the multiple lines of defenses that Russia
has built throughout eastern Ukraine? Will they have enough strength to achieve the majority of
their goals against the occupying Russian forces? These goals most likely will include cutting off
Russian connections to the Crimean Peninsula, while also securing significant cities such
as Mariupol and Melitopol, while securing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station,
the largest nuclear station in all of Europe. - Would the Russian defenses and logistics
stockpiles have been sufficiently degraded? This would include attacking Russian rear areas
where artillery and fuel have been stockpiled, while also attacking bridges and transportation
nodes throughout the occupied portion of Ukraine. From such attacks, Ukraine would hope to confuse
the Russian command and control structure about the direction and coordination of the Ukrainian
offensive, while also degrading their ability to respond with adequate reinforcements and supplies.
- Lastly, would the ground be dry enough to support the movement of hundreds of heavy,
tracked, armored vehicles, as well as their less mobile wheeled supply transports? While
currently the ground is sufficiently dry and firm enough for cross-country travel,
this had not been the case for most of the Spring, all the way through mid-May.
Where Will Ukraine Strike? Retired US Brigadier General
Mark Kimmitt, who’s seen combat in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, spoke with the Wall Street
Journal on May 23rd. He suggested that Ukraine had four likely avenues of attack.
First, from the region of Kherson in the northwest corner of the occupied territories due east to
the Sea of Azov, cutting off the Crimean Peninsula. However, the recent destruction
of the Nova Kakhovka dam has made crossing that section of the Dnipro River south of Kherson much
more difficult, at least for the time being. That leaves three other main axis of advance:
His second choice was in the western region of Zaporizhzhia Oblast south towards the rail
hub of Tokmak, and then further south to the port of Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov. Kimmitt pointed
out there are good roads through this area, making advances with both wheeled and tracked
vehicles easier. But as Ukraine discovered with their initial probing attacks in this region,
the roads are heavily mined, as is the ground on both sides. Russian artillery units also have
these areas sighted in, so their artillery fire is more accurate than normal Russian
counter artillery. But the terrain is mostly flat ground all the way south, so it’s good
terrain for highly maneuverable tracked units. Kimmitt’s third choice is in the Donetsk Oblast
south and southeast towards Mariupol. Losing that city early in the war was a significant
defeat for the Ukrainians, and retaking it would be an equally significant defeat for
Russia. Though the city itself has almost no inhabitable buildings still standing,
it does still have port facilities, which would still be useful to Russian resupply
efforts. The port needs to be captured or otherwise denied to the Russians.
His fourth option would be for Ukraine to attack due east from the Kharkiv area towards Luhansk,
near the Russian border. Such an offensive would send a clear message to the Russian people that
Ukraine’s forces are strong enough to force Russian troops back onto their own soil. If
Ukraine was able to close off this section of the border, it would do as much to deny
logistical support to the remaining Russian occupation as capturing Crimea and all the
ports on the Sea of Azov put together. A Closer Look at the Terrain Ahead
The eastern region of Zaporizhia has two parallel defensive lines running west to east,
while the western half of the region has three lines. Each of these lines is separated by a
distance of eight to ten miles from the ones south of it. Russian strategy is to abandon the
first line when they’re about to be overrun, and retreat—or as the Russian general staff calls it,
“redeploying in force”—to the next line. These defensive lines include extensive trench networks,
reinforced strong points, dug-in tanks, machine gun and mortar emplacements, all backed up by more
distant artillery units and the ability to call in helicopter gunships and ground attack fighters.
One of the more extensive defensive systems surrounds the key transportation hub of Tokmak,
which sits about 12 to 15 miles south of the third Russian defensive line. While
these defenses are indeed extensive, there is some doubt from Western
intelligence experts that Russia has enough trained troops to sufficiently
man these fortifications. Ukraine’s plan is to probe these defenses all along the front,
determine where they are the weakest, and push their armored brigades forward from there.
Tokmak is a natural deep-penetration target for any Ukrainian breakthrough. A successful
capture of Tokmak will provide Ukraine with two advantages: first, it will cut the main rail
line that runs from there southwest to Melitopol and beyond that to the Crimean Peninsula. That
will leave only the Kerch Bridge into Crimea from mainland Russia as the sole source of supply and
reinforcements for almost a third of the Russian defense forces in Ukraine. If Ukraine begins to
advance beyond Tokmak, the Russian defenders may start cutting their losses and retreat.
If that happens, the limited approaches to the bridge will become a highly congested chokepoint.
More importantly, capturing Tokmak would mean that the Ukraine forces will have breached the
last line of Russian defenses south of the Dnipro River. There are additional unconnected trench and
strongpoint networks scattered across the rest of the Zaporizhia Oblast, as well as a significant
series of defenses at the very northern edge of Crimea itself, but the primary east-west
axis of Russian trenches will have been breached. From Tokmak, the Ukrainian army can continue 40
miles southwest to Melitopol, further boxing in the remaining Russian forces there, or head 100
miles east to Mariupol, one of the two key ports on the Sea of Azov still open to Russian forces.
Berdyansk is the other key port, lying another 53 miles further east of Mariupol. Both ports have
been under repeated bombardment since early May 2023 from Ukrainian long range missiles,
especially the newly-arrived Storm Shadow. These attacks have reduced the effectiveness
of the ports as loading and supply facilities. As Ukrainian forces edge closer to these two main
ports, Ukrainian artillery will also play a role in denying access to Russian ships. At some point,
the remaining Russian forces will have to decide whether to retreat east to
the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, or to turn southwest and head for the
Crimean Peninsula. By the time Ukrainian artillery is within range of the ports,
about 130 to 150 miles away, no Russian ships will be able to supply troops safely.
But will Ukraine be able to break through the multiple layers of Russian defenses? Will they
be able to neutralize Russia’s superiority in ground attack aircraft? Will Ukraine take these
cities before they run out of armored brigades, artillery shells and rockets?
Available Ukrainian Resources Multiple Western sources report that,
according to their best estimates, Ukraine has between ten and twelve armored combat brigades,
held in reserve until the Ukrainian leadership has determined where the
weakest point is in the Russian defenses. When that decision has been made, they’ll
commit elements from this massive reserve and punch a hole into the less-defended rear areas.
How large is this reserve force? A Ukrainian tank battalion normally has around 500 combat soldiers
or more, with 31 tanks and an equivalent number of armored infantry vehicles. An armored infantry
battalion would have about the same number. There’d be additional vehicles for carrying
engineers, air defense units, logistics and support troops, as well as more standard infantry
and replacement troops. An armored brigade would likely consist of three tank battalions and two
mechanized infantry battalions. In total, then, an armored brigade is going to have around 250 to
300 armored vehicles, a little less than half of which would be tanks, and as many as 4,000 troops.
There are Western estimates that the Ukrainians have gathered from
seven to twelve armored brigades. Some may have only Ukrainian or captured Russian equipment,
while others will have a mix of Western-provided vehicles, which currently include Leopard tanks
and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). When we see two or three of those brigades (around
500-750 armored vehicles) focused on a narrow front, it’ll then be possible to say that the
main attack has probably started and that’s where Ukraine is hoping to break through. But even then,
we have to be careful. The Ukrainian General Staff will want to keep the
Russians guessing about the location of the main attack for as long as possible,
and they won’t be too bothered (and will probably welcome) social media bloggers getting it wrong.
If the West provides everything the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) need,
especially long-range precision weapons like the US ATACMS , then some analysts anticipate
that Ukraine can recapture Crimea. Taking the peninsula and denying Russia’s Black
Sea Fleet their anchorage at Sevastopol would clearly be one of Ukraine’s primary
goals of the offensive. If the UAF can get to within 150 miles of Sevastopol,
and the smaller ports of Saky and Dzankoy, their long range artillery and Storm Shadow missiles
would make using those ports impossible for the Russian navy. By forcing the Russian missile-armed
ships further away from Crimea, Ukraine will be better able to defend against the numerous
missile attacks Russia has been lobbing at Ukrainian population centers, while giving
their air defense systems more time to intercept missiles aimed at cities like Kyiv and Odesa.
The overall aim of the offensive, which has been stated many times by Ukrainian president
Zelenskyy, is to liberate “the illegally occupied areas based on our constitutionally
defined legitimate borders, which are recognized internationally.” Though it may be a tall order
to recapture all of the occupied territory, it’s hoped that losing Crimea and a significant portion
of the territory in the south and east of the country might convince the majority of Russia,
if not Putin himself, that their continued aggression is meaningless.
Can the Counter-Offensive Succeed? One of the most significant indicators
for whether the Ukrainian counter-offensive can succeed is the level of casualties the
Russian army will sustain. According to a Ukrainian reporter for the Kyiv Post,
Russia’s military has already reached the point where more than 50% of their armed
forces had been killed or wounded and unable to continue their service. When a unit reaches that
50% loss status, they’re considered “combat ineffective.” To have the entire Russian army
considered combat ineffective is a horrifying aspect for Russian commanders to deal with.
The same report announced that in the ten days of the initial phase of the counter-offensive,
Russia had lost an additional 7,390 troops killed and an additional 15-22,000 wounded.
That’s a staggering number of casualties in just ten days. These losses are also before the vast
majority of Ukrainian armored brigades have even been committed to the offensive. The ratio of
wounded to dead soldiers reflects how badly Russia cares for its wounded troops. This ratio is far
worse (meaning more wounded troops die after being wounded) than, for example, the U.S. rate
during World War II (which was 4 surviving soldiers for every 1 that died in action),
in Vietnam (a 5 to 1 ratio), and much worse than the US fighting in Iraq (10 surviving soldiers for
every soldier killed). In comparison, Ukraine's rate has been estimated to be 10 to 1 or better.
Much of Ukraine’s success can be attested to by having a more advanced medical system than Russia,
as well as many more volunteers helping out with the Ukraine’s wounded soldiers.
An aggregate of Ukrainian, Western intelligence and Russian military bloggers have also reported
that as of June 14th, Ukraine may have destroyed as many as 80 Russian tanks and
140 armored vehicles, along with more than 240 artillery and rocket systems in that same 10-day
stretch. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 11th that Russia had lost 17 tanks and
24 Armored Personnel Vehicles (APV) in just a single day of their offensive. These numbers,
even if a little on the optimistic side, point to disastrous overall Russian losses
that won’t be sustainable over the course of the continued offensive.
We must ask, what are Ukraine’s overall aims of their offensive? If it’s to retake all of Ukraine,
back to its pre-2014 borders, before Russia made its first incisions, then that may take some time,
but it’s certainly doable. It’s even more possible when additional US and Western forces arrive in
country. Ukraine is awaiting 31 promised US Abrams tanks, enough for a tank battalion,
and up to 100 F-16s from both NATO countries and possibly from Australia as well. Tank
crews and pilots are already being trained on these new weapons, but it’ll take time to
get this equipment into Ukraine, along with the repair and support logistics needed to
keep them maintained and serviced. British Challenger 2 tanks are also on their way.
However, if it comes to Ukraine convincing Putin to halt his aggressive foreign policy
and de-escalate his militaristic approach to his neighbors, many analysts see that as it
never going to happen. Maxim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center,
wrote in June for Foreign Policy, that the war has allowed Putin to work towards his
ideal vision of Russia, helped by numerous Asia-directed transport and energy links,
to a society less reliant on the US dollar. The share of Russian exports paid in US dollars fell
from 90 percent prior to the invasion, to less than 50 percent in December, 2022. Of course,
that drop-off is mostly due to the sanctions placed on Russia by the US and the EU,
sanctions that have crippled Russia’s economy. But as long as Putin and his oligarchs,
who hold the real power in the country, don’t feel the effects of the sanctions too much, and as long
as Putin can shield the residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg from the direct effects of the war,
especially the mobilization of conscripts, he will feel safe in continuing the war.
He’s made every effort to force the poorer and less-urban areas of Russia to bear the
brunt of the draft. According to an October 2022 report by the investigative outlet iStories in
cooperation with the war monitoring group Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), 23 of
the 26 regions with the highest proportion of recruits have incomes below the national average.
The conscription has caused labor shortages in Siberia’s Krasnoyarsk region, which reported
the highest share of mobilized reservists nationwide at 5.5%. The Sevastopol region
in southern Russia reported recruitment totals of 4%, while the republics of Buryatia and Dagestan,
two of Russia's poorest regions that have already suffered the highest death tolls in Ukraine,
recruited 3.7% and 2.6% respectively. By contrast, Moscow and St. Petersburg
recruited well below 1% of their reservists, according to iStories and CIT calculations.
This may be why Ukrainian-allied forces have begun sending drone attacks against
Moscow. Some argue that the attacks have been targeted to the affluent suburbs of Rublyovka,
where many oligarchs, high government officials, and other elites maintain expensive homes and
mansions. Public opinion for the invasion has reached as high as 90% in Russia’s tightly-script
and heavily controlled mediascape. But attacks on Moscow’s elite have brought some measure of
acceptance from the average Muscovite, who even see sanctions on oligarchs as a good thing.
Ukraine’s counter-offensive is indeed in place and making its first significant attacks. The
majority of their armored brigades have yet to see combat, and when they do, their impact
will be extensive. If Ukraine can continue to keep Russia’s numerically superior air force away from
ground attack roles by employing significant numbers of man-portable air defense systems,
MANPADs, and if they can continue to eliminate Russian artillery with accurate counterbattery
fire, then there is every indication that Ukraine can retake significant
portions of their country, including Crimea. Continued probing attacks over the course of
the next few weeks, until the first weeks of July, will determine how soon Ukraine can direct where
the hammer will fall. And when that hammer does fall, the morale of the Russian army,
heavily made up of conscripts with little training and without the motivation to die
in a foreign land for “Putin’s Folly,” may break. When Ukrainian armored brigades begin
roaming unchallenged through the majority of the Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, the defeat
of the invasion may finally be at hand. Now counterattack boredom and go check
out Ukraine's plan to move the war inside Russia, or click this other video instead!