﻿In the summer of 2021, China sparked great alarm in Washington when it tested hypersonic missiles.
Some in the United States even feared that this test was another Sputnik moment. General Mark
Milley, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, denied that the test was a
Sputnik equivalent, but said it was “very close to that.” How real is this fear? What does the
nuclear balance of power between the United States and China look like? If the unthinkable happened,
what could a nuclear confrontation between the two look like? Let’s begin.
China has grown immensely wealthy over the last few decades, especially since it joined the World
Trade Organization in 2001, and Beijing has used large portions of its enriched
coffers in the drive to create a world-class military capable of competing with the United
States. China’s naval and air capabilities have increased enormously, but Beijing is now keen to
share the love with its nuclear forces as well. China was one of the recognized nuclear powers in
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which went into effect in 1970. However, it had always had
a limited nuclear capability compared to the true nuclear superpowers of the time,
the United States and the Soviet Union. It had few ways of delivering nuclear weapons beyond
ICBM launchers and silos, and had a small number of active warheads. That has begun to change
at a rapid pace in the last couple of years. In 2020, the United States estimated that China
had a little more than 200 nuclear warheads. By the end of 2022, however, China had doubled
that number. If Beijing continues its nuclear buildup at this pace, it could have about 1,500
nuclear warheads by 2035. However, China is not only building up the number of warheads at its
disposal, but the means of delivering them. In 2021, China appeared to be building 200
new nuclear missile silos in its Gansu and Xinjiang provinces. However, China
understands that these silos are easy targets, so it is also building more road-mobile ICBMs,
new ballistic missile submarines, and new bomber-delivered nuclear weapons. In other words,
China is trying to create an effective nuclear triad of its own in a bid to protect its nuclear
capability and if need be, enhance its offensive nuclear potential. China completed the triad with
its deployment of the nuclear-capable Xian Hong-6 bomber in 2020. Meanwhile, China conducted 135
ballistic missile tests in 2021, more than every other country in the world combined.
The biggest buzz, though, went to its hypersonic test that summer. The July 2021 test featured
a hypersonic missile that encircled the world before hitting its target. It flew for a total
of 40,000 kilometers, the longest flight of any Chinese land attack weapon on record.
At this point, it is important to clear away some of the cobwebs. Hypersonic
missiles (projectiles capable of exceeding Mach 5) are not new. Traditional ICBMs have
long exceeded these speeds. What would make China’s 2021 weapon new is its combination
of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
A FOBS works by flying into low Earth orbit to an altitude of about 240 kilometers. This allows the
device to remain below the line of sight of radar systems designed to pick up the arc of traditional
ballistic missiles. Then, before completing a full orbit, the FOBS turns around and performs
a retrograde engine burn, slowing its speed so that it will intersect with its designated
target. The end result is that a FOBS can strike from an unexpected direction. For example,
a missile launched to low orbit over Antarctica can turn around and hit Alaska. The Soviet Union
experimented with these systems in the 1970s but work on FOBS was abandoned after the SALT II
Treaty banned them and Soviet submarines became more capable of launching ballistic missiles.
China is interested in picking up where the Soviet Union left off, however. Beijing
partially sees this as a necessity thanks to greater American investment in missile
defense systems following its withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.
The second component of the system, the HGV, makes the FOBS even more unpredictable. Glide
vehicles differ from traditional weapons in how they move toward their targets.
Traditional ballistic missiles come at a fast, but predictable arc. HGVs ride up to orbit, descend,
and glide through the atmosphere to reach their targets. An HGV is able to maneuver,
roll, or even pull up on reentry to re-exit the atmosphere and then enter it again. Through these
devices, an HGV can alter its trajectory while maintaining hypersonic velocities, making it fast
and hard for missile defense systems to predict. China claimed that its test was of a space plane,
not a weapons system, but this was a clever response. It exposes the overlap between space
vehicles and these types of weapons systems. The hypersonic missile missed its target by
about two-dozen miles. This is of little comfort if such a weapon were to carry
a strategic nuclear warhead, however. The test also raised alarms about an intelligence failure,
as US officials realized that China’s advancement in hypersonic weapons was further along than they
once thought. Potentially, China could send this new weapon on a trajectory over the South
Pole. The weapon could then turn around and glide toward American targets. Because American missile
defense systems are focused on trajectories over the North Pole, which is the route that Soviet
ballistic missiles would have taken during the Cold War, the new Chinese weapon could
leave the United States particularly vulnerable. China’s moves are intended to even the playing
field in a dangerous game where it had long lagged behind. The United States has the world’s second
largest nuclear arsenal, with 5,224 warheads. The United States currently deploys some of its
nuclear weapons to five other nations: Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. The
forward deployment reduces the risk that America’s ability for nuclear retaliation will be wiped out
in an enemy first strike. It also gives the United States greater ability to launch nuclear attacks
of its own. American nuclear warheads were once deployed to Japan and South Korea, but have since
been removed. If nuclear tensions were to escalate with China, it is probable the United States would
redeploy those weapons there; something the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested could
be a necessity, given the current situation in the region, although he only made this
suggestion after his premiership had concluded. The United States is regarded as being behind
China and Russia in the development of hypersonic technology. There have also been major alarms
about the state of America’s nuclear triad in the last decade. Most of the weapons and delivery
systems are many decades old. For example, the land-based part of the nuclear triad consists of
about 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles. This weapons system began development in 1964 and
entered service in 1970. It is currently the only land-based ICBM in the United States military, and
the Air Force plans to use it into the 2030s. Some of the United States’ land-based ICBM systems are
so old that until 2019, they used 1970s-era floppy disks as part of the command and control system.
Other parts of the IT system are as old. While this has the advantage of not being vulnerable
to cyber warfare, it also means the system is expensive to maintain, as modern engineers
are unfamiliar with it, and the Air Force has increasingly needed to rely on costly civilian
specialists to maintain the old architecture. The United States maintains a significant
lead over China in the realm of submarine warfare. However, its Ohio-class ballistic
missile submarines are also old, with their plans originating in the 1970s and the first
vessels being launched in the early 1980s. Meanwhile, the United States has only 20
active bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Its fleet of B-1 and B-52 bombers
were once capable of doing this, but were altered to be conventional-only in the
1990s. These alterations can be done away with, but these weapons platforms are also old, anyway.
In recent years, the United States has acknowledged that it allowed its nuclear
capability to atrophy following the end of the Cold War. During the Obama administration,
the United States made plans to modernize the nuclear triad, which took more concrete shape
during the Trump administration. It consisted of a $1.2 trillion plan between 2017 and 2046,
including $772 billion for the modernization of strategic nuclear delivery systems,
$25 billion for tactical nuclear delivery systems, and $445 billion for the facilities needed for
the operation of the new nuclear triad. One of the primary weapons in this new
arsenal will be the Minuteman III’s successor, the LGM-35 Sentinel, which the Air Force plans
to have ready by 2030. The Sentinel will come with new silos and a new command-and-control system.
The United States is also working on a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine.
This will be the Columbia-class submarine, set to launch in 2031, with 12 of the new
vessels planned for construction. So important is this goal that the Navy has identified the
Columbia-class submarine as its top priority program, a nod to how vital the US submarine
fleet is to deterring China’s ambitions. Each Columbia-class submarine will be able to carry
up to 16 Trident D5 missiles, each of which can potentially carry 12 Mk-4 reentry vehicles.
Although the United States has phased out these multiple reentry vehicles on its nuclear ballistic
missiles since 2014 to comply with the New START treaty with Russia, the missiles can
be re-equipped with them if the need arises. China is not a member of the New START treaty.
Finally, there is the coming B-21 Raider bomber which is set to replace both the B-1 Lancer
and B-2 Spirit. The Raider was rolled out to photographers for the first time in December
2022 and is scheduled to enter service in 2027, with a maiden flight expected in the remaining
months of 2023. The Air Force plans to purchase up to 145 B-21s, depending on the plane’s engineering
and manufacturing development. As the successor of the B-2, the B-21 will be capable of delivering
nuclear weapons like the B61 and B83 bombs. The United States has also been trying its
best to catch up in the hypersonic missile race and may have closed the gap. In October 2022,
the United States launched a test of several hypersonic missile components. These included
communications and navigations equipment and a glide vehicle that can withstand the friction
generated by moving at hypersonic velocities. The test was designed to validate aspects of
the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike and the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon programs.
The Pentagon considered the tests a success. For now, these programs are only experiments,
as the Pentagon has still not made a formal decision to acquire hypersonic weapons,
according to the Congressional Research Service. Still, the Defense Department spent $4.7 billion
on hypersonic weapons research in fiscal year 2023, up from $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2022.
Adding these weapons to the United States’ traditional nuclear arsenal seems inevitable.
How might a nuclear war break out? China officially has a no first use policy when
it comes to nuclear weapons, even if its nuclear forces are attacked by conventional enemy forces.
Only in the case of a nuclear weapons strike, officially, would China use its own nukes to
retaliate. This policy started with its first nuclear test in 1964, when China declared it:
“Will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” This policy
was reaffirmed in a classified Chinese document for the operators of China’s nuclear forces,
where it put repeat reminders about its no first use policy. However, there is
skepticism in Washington. The document, called “The Science of Second Artillery Operations,” has
a section concerning what Chinese nuclear forces should do “if a strong military power possessing
nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out
intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military
strategy to resist the enemy.” This “strong military power” is clearly the United States.
The document suggests that Chinese nuclear forces could “lower the threshold” in this
scenario and put its nuclear weapons on alert. This is an important distinction
because unlike the United States, China’s policy has been to keep its nuclear forces off-alert.
Its warheads are not mated to its ICBMs and its nuclear-armed submarines are not on continuous
patrol at sea. This suggests that China takes its no first use policy seriously. By putting
its nuclear forces on alert, China would hope to deter the United States from taking further
military action and to not use its nuclear weapons in a potential first strike, which may
be tempting as military tensions escalate, given the still-small size of China’s nuclear arsenal
in comparison to that of the United States. However, the document’s addition of the notion
that China could use nuclear threats to compel the United States to stop a conventional attack
made Dr. Gregory Kulacki, the China Project Manager at the Union of Concerned Scientists,
uneasy. The use of nuclear threats to stop a conventional attack can slip into escalation
if conventional fighting breaks out. Within the confined and disputed waters of the South
China Sea, there are many places where this can happen. It would not necessarily take something
as dramatic as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. An accidental encounter in the South China Sea,
such as during one of the United States’ Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS),
could be the trigger to a broader conflict via miscalculation. Close military calls between
the United States and Chinese armed forces have happened during these FONOPS before,
as China becomes more and more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the area,
claims that the United States does not recognize. Suppose it’s the year 2031. The United States and
China are at a standoff over an attempted blockade of the South China Sea’s shipping
lanes to Taiwan or another American ally in the region. A FONOP leads to a protracted firefight
between vessels of the United States Navy and the PLAN. If conventional conflict escalates enough,
or if China’s leaders consider themselves threatened enough, nuclear readiness of
the like that Dr. Kulacki suggested could cause further tensions and make one of the two sides
believe that the other is going nuclear. For the United States, the threshold for a
nuclear strike is lower than one would believe. It does not have a no first use policy. Authorization
to use nuclear weapons can only come from the President. Critics suggest that this should be
changed and that further restraints should be placed on the President, but for now,
the President can authorize a nuclear strike at any time and for any reason. The only limitation
to this authority would be under the Laws of Armed Conflict. For example, if the attack would cause
unnecessary humanitarian suffering, or if the attack’s target is not a military necessity,
the order could be disregarded. However, even in these circumstances, it is likely only that the
order would be changed, rather than halted. So if the President believes that China will
disregard its no first use policy and resort to nuclear weapons in order to stop a conventional
conflict between it and the United States, American nuclear weapons may take to the skies.
Once conventional pressures heat up, the impetus to respond and create a nuclear first strike could
become acute if the United States believes its missile defense systems will be overwhelmed,
or if China believes that it will lose its ability to retaliate thanks to its still relatively
small nuclear arsenal. Preventing this from happening would require seemingly
trustworthy communication between two sides that have already been shooting at each other.
How might a nuclear war go? Even with its aging triad, the current
nuclear balance of power favors the United States, especially beneath the waves. The United States
currently has 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Each can carry up to 20 nuclear-armed
ballistic or cruise missiles. Some of these are deployed to the contested waters in the
Indo-Pacific region. If a nuclear confrontation were to break out with China, the submarines would
give the United States its greatest advantage. China is far behind the United States when it
comes to underwater warfare. Detecting America’s nuclear-powered submarines is a tall order for
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). In a nuclear confrontation, America’s Ohio-class
submarines would swing into action and attack important targets, such as China’s
Yulin naval base on Hainan Island, which houses its fleet of Type 094 Jin-class,
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. In contrast to the Ohio-class, China only has four
of these submarines, and the United States may hope to take one or more of them off the board
by striking the base. Each Type 094 can carry 12 ballistic missiles with a range between 7,200 and
9,000 kilometers. This would be insufficient to reach the Continental United States if launched
from waters near China, but would threaten all of America’s bases and allies in the region,
plus Alaska and Hawaii. In a nuclear scenario, it is unlikely that all of the Type 094s would
be taken out at once, although they are louder than Cold War-era Soviet submarines, so they
would likely be found before they could get into range to attack the Continental United
States. However, China is also working on a successor ballistic missile submarine,
the Type 096, which is quieter and would be armed with new missiles with a range exceeding
9,000 kilometers. The Pentagon expects the Type 096 to be operational by 2030,
further adding to China’s nuclear readiness. Nuclear missile silos and bases likely to host
China’s mobile ballistic missile launchers would also be targeted by American submarines. Some of
these mobile launchers which may be armed with ballistic missiles armed with nuclear-tipped
HGVs. Examples would include the medium range DF-17 with its DF-ZF HGV, which has a range
between 1,800 and 2,500 kilometers. This weapon system became operational in 2019
and although it cannot reach the American mainland, it poses a serious threat to the
United States’ bases and fleets in the region. The Ohio-class submarines would be hard for China
to remove from the board. Dozens of nuclear ballistic or cruise missiles would come over
Chinese airspace in an all-out attack. China has missiles capable of reaching
the United States, too, and America’s interior nuclear bases, naval bases,
and silos would come under attack. Air defense systems would destroy some of these, but any that
make it through would do devastating damage, and if its hypersonic-related technology comes online,
it would have greater success. Additionally, China’s leaders have had a longstanding policy
of targeting adversarial cities in a nuclear second strike, so even if the United States
seeks to avoid civilian areas as much as possible in an attack, China probably won’t.
It is difficult to tell how exactly a nuclear war between the United States and China would go,
except that it would be the most catastrophic confrontation ever recorded. What is clear is
that China’s nuclear posture is quickly changing from one of minimum deterrence to something
far more offensive. The expansion in its nuclear capabilities allows China’s military to be bolder
in pursuing its expansionist ambitions. Before, America’s nuclear superiority made it harder for
China to directly challenge the international order led by the United States. That is now
beginning to change and Washington is willing to spend trillions to ensure that its biggest
strategic rival does not eclipse its nuclear capability. Describing the current situation as
a return to a Cold War-style nuclear arms race may be overdoing it, but one thing is certain:
We are closer to that kind of confrontation that at any time since the days of the Soviet Union.
What do you think about China’s military buildup? How does it change the balance of power
with the United States and what would a nuclear confrontation between them look like? Don’t forget
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