Hi. I use some of George MacDonald Ross’s translations in my philosophy classes, but unfortunately
his website is no longer online.
To preserve and share some of its contents, I made this video.
WILLIAM OF OCKHAM INTRODUCTION by George MacDonal Ross
William of Ockham (c.1285–c.1349) was one of the most influential philosophers England
has ever produced.
Although he is best known for his ‘razor’ (the principle that the most economical hypothesis
is to be preferred), his position on universals looks more like conceptualism than nominalism.
John Duns Scotus (c.1265–1308), who Ockham attacks for his realism in chapter 16, was
also English (Northumbrian, not Scottish).
Duns was famous for the subtlety of his philosophy, in particular for his distinction between
‘haecceity (‘thisness’) and ‘quiddity’ (‘whatness’).
Whether fairly or not, the word ‘dunce’ derives from his name.
As is typical of scholastic writing, there is a lot of detailed, technical argumentation.
Ockham is mainly concerned to refute the Aristotelian view that the universal form of the species
belongs to the essence of each individual member of the species.
Ockham wrote in Latin, and I have translated from Summa Logicae, ed.
P. Boehner (New York, 1974), to which the page numbers in square brackets refer.
WILLIAM OF OCKHAM Excerpts from THE COMPLETE LOGIC
Translation copyright George MacDonald Ross
Chapter 14 . . . We must consider, firstly, terms of
the second intention; and secondly, terms of the first intention.
As has been said, terms of the second intention are e.g. ‘universal’, ‘genus’, ‘species’, etc.
So in a moment we will have to say something about the supposed ‘five universals’.
But first we must discuss the term ‘universal’ which is common to them (since it is predicated
of every universal) and the term ‘singular’, which is its opposite.
The first thing to realise is that ‘singular’ has two meanings.
In one sense the word ‘singular’ means that which is one and not many.
In this sense, those who hold that a universal is a quality of the mind predicable of a multiplicity
not on its own account but on account of the multiplicity, have to say that every universal
is truly and really singular: because, just as any word, however wide its application,
is truly and really singular and numerically one (because it is one and not many), so a
concept signifying a number of things outside the mind is truly and really singular and
numerically one (because it is one thing and not many), even though it signifies a number
of things.
In its other sense, the word ‘singular’ means all that which is not only one and not
many, but is not even by nature a sign of a number of things.
Taking ‘singular’ in this sense, nothing universal is singular, since any universal
is by nature a sign of a number of things and by nature predicable of a number of things.
Hence, if something which is not numerically one is called ‘universal’ (and this is
a meaning which many people give to ‘universal’), then I maintain that nothing is universal,
unless perhaps you twist the meaning of the word and say that a people is a single universal
on the grounds that it is not one but many — but that would be childish. . . .
So in the first sense, ‘singular’ is predicable of the universal, but not in the second sense.
To give an analogy: we say that the sun is a universal cause while remaining truly a
particular and singular thing; so there is a sense in which it is truly a particular
and singular cause.
For the sun is called a universal cause because it is the cause of many things (i.e. all earthly
things subject to change); but it is also called a particular cause because it is a
single cause and not many causes.
This is how a concept can be called universal, in that it is a sign predicable of many; but
also singular, in that it is a single thing and not many things.
However, it must also be realised that there are two sorts of universal: one sort is naturally
universal, i.e. it is naturally a sign predicable of a number of things (analogous to the way
smoke naturally means fire, groaning means the pain of the sick, and smiling means inner
happiness).
This sort of universal is nothing other than a concept in the mind, and certainly no sort
of a substance or accident outside the mind.
I shall say more about this sort of universal in the following chapters.
The other sort of universal exists by convention.
Thus the word actually used, which is in fact a single quality, is universal in that it
is a sign deliberately chosen to mean a number of things.
In so far as a word is common, it can be called universal; but this is not true by nature,
but only by convention.
Chapter 15
Since it is not enough to say this without giving convincing reasons for it, I shall
present some reasons for what I have said, and cite authorities in support.
It can be convincingly proved that no universal is any sort of substance existing outside
the mind, as follows:
1. No universal is a single and unitary substance.
If this were so, it would follow that Socrates was a universal, because there is no reason
why one singular substance should be any more a universal than another.
Therefore no singular substance is a universal, but every substance is unitary and singular,
since every substance is either one thing and not many, or is a number of things.
If it is one and not many, it is unitary, for this is what everybody means by ‘unitary’.
But if a substance is a number of things, it is either a number of singular things or
a number of universal things.
If the first, it follows that a substance would be a number of singular substances:
consequently, by parity of reasoning, a number of people would be a substance; and then,
although the universal would be distinguishable from a single particular, it would not be
distinguishable from a number of particulars.
If, on the other hand, a number of universals were a substance, I ask of any one of these
universal things: is it a number of things, or is it one and not many?
If the second, it follows that it is singular; if the first, I ask: is it a number of singular
things, or a number of universal things?
Thus, either there will be an infinite [51] regress, or it will be avoided by our saying
that every universal substance is also singular.
The only remaining alternative is that there is no substance which is a universal.
2. If a universal were one substance existing in singular substances and distinct from them,
it would follow that it could exist without them, because everything which is naturally
prior to something else can, by divine power, exist without it; but this consequence is absurd.
3. Assuming the opinion under discussion were true, no individual could be created if something
individual had to exist already, because it would not get all its being from nothing if
the universal in it were in something else first.
For the same reason it would also follow that God could not annihilate one of the individuals
of the substance without destroying all its other individuals.
For if he annihilated some individual he would destroy the whole of the essence of the individual,
and consequently he would destroy the universal in it and in the others; hence the others
would not survive, since they could not survive lacking some part of themselves, such as the
universal is supposed to be.
4. Such a universal could not be something totally outside the essence of the individual, therefore
it would belong to the essence of the individual, and consequently the individual would be composed
of universals, and thus would be no more singular than universal.
5. It follows that something of the essence of Christ would be wretched and damned, since
that common nature existing really in Christ and in the damned one would be damned because
it was damned in Judas. But this is absurd.
Many more reasons could be adduced, but I shall omit them for the sake of brevity.
I can also cite various authorities in support of the same conclusions.
. . .
From the above and many other authorities it can be gathered that no universal is a
substance however it is understood.
So it does not depend on how it is understood whether something is a substance or not, even
though it does depend on the meaning of the term whether the word ‘substance’ is or
is not predicable of it (though not of itself).
E.g. in the sentence, ‘The dog is an animal,’ if ‘dog’ means a barking animal it is
true; if a constellation it is false.
However, it is impossible for one and the same thing to be a substance in one sense,
but not in another.
So it must be straightforwardly conceded that no universal is a substance, however it is
understood.
Rather, any universal whatever is a mental concept, which, according to one likely theory,
is nothing other than the act of understanding.
Hence it is said that the concept through which I understand a human being is the natural
sign for humans — natural in the way that a groan is the sign of illness, sadness, or
pain; and a sign in that it can stand for humans in mental propositions, just as a word
can stand for things in spoken propositions . . .
From these and many other passages it is obvious that a universal is a mental concept naturally
predicable of a number of things.
There is also a conclusive argument for this: everybody agrees that all universals are predicable
of a number of things; but only a mental concept or a conventional sign is naturally predicable
of things (this not being true of any substance); therefore only a mental concept or a conventional
sign can be universal.
But I do not now use the word ‘universal’ for a conventional sign, but for that which
is naturally universal.
It is obvious that a substance is not naturally predicable of anything; because if so, it
would follow that a proposition was a compound of particular substances, and consequently
the subject could be in Rome and the predicate in England, which is absurd.
Similarly, a proposition exists only in the mind, in speech, or in writing; therefore
its parts exist only in the mind, in speech, or in writing; but things of this sort are
not particular substances.
So it has been established that no proposition can be composed of substances; but a proposition
is composed of universals; therefore universals are not substances in any sense.
Chapter 16
Although it is obvious to many people that a universal is not any substance existing
outside the mind in individual things and really distinct from them, yet there are some
who think that a universal is in some way outside the mind in individual things, not
distinct from them really, but only distinct from them formally.
Thus they say that human nature is in Socrates, and that it is particularised into Socrates
through an individual difference which is distinct from the human nature in him, not
really but formally.
Consequently it is not the case that there are two things, since the one is not formally
the other.
In my view, this opinion is utterly implausible. (1) In the created world, there can never
be any sort of distinction outside the mind, except when there are distinct things; therefore
if there is to be any sort of distinction between the nature and the difference, it
must be the case that they are things that are distinct really.
Here is a proof of the minor premise in syllogistic form: That nature is not formally distinct
from that nature; this individual difference is formally distinct from this nature; therefore
this individual difference is not this nature.
(2) One and the same thing cannot be both common and exclusive; but according to them,
the individual difference is exclusive and the universal is common; therefore a universal
and an individual difference can never be the same thing.
(3) One and the same actual object cannot be qualified by opposites; but the common
and the exclusive are opposites; therefore one and the same thing cannot be both common
and exclusive.
But this is what would follow if an individual difference and a common nature were the same thing.
(4) If a common nature were really the same as an individual difference, then there would
really exist as many common natures as there are individual differences, and consequently
none of them would be common, but each would be exclusive to the difference to which it
is really identical.
(5) Everything is distinguished from everything from which it is different, either in itself
or by something intrinsic to it; but the humanity of Socrates is different from that of Plato;
therefore they are distinguished from each other; therefore they are not distinguished
by added differences.
(6) According to Aristotle, things of different species must be numerically different; but
the nature of a human and the nature of a donkey are specifically different; therefore
they are themselves numerically distinct; therefore each of them is in itself numerically one.
(7) If something cannot possibly belong to more than one thing, then it cannot possibly
be predicated of more than one thing.
If the nature we are considering is the same really as an individual difference, then it
cannot possibly belong to more than one individual; therefore it cannot possibly be predicated
of more than one thing, and consequently cannot possibly be universal.
(8) If we consider the supposed individual difference and the nature it particularises,
we can ask whether the distinction between them is greater or less than that between
two individuals.
It cannot be greater, because they are not different really, whereas individuals are
different really.
Nor can it be less, because then they would be essentially the same in the way that two
individuals can be essentially the same.
Consequently, if one of them is intrinsically unique, the other must be intrinsically unique
as well.
(9) Again, either the nature is the individual difference, or it is not.
If it is, then the following syllogism holds: this individual difference is exclusive and
not common; this individual difference is the nature; therefore the nature is exclusive
and not common. Q.E.D.
A similar syllogistic argument is as follows: this individual difference is not formally
distinct from the individual difference; this individual difference is the nature; therefore
the nature is not formally distinct from the individual difference.
If, on the other hand, we take it that this individual difference is not the nature, we
still get what we want, since the following holds: the individual difference is not the
nature, therefore the individual difference is not the nature really.
This is so because the opposite of an antecedent follows from the opposite of a consequent.
In this case: the individual difference is the nature really, therefore the individual
difference is the nature.
The inference is obviously legitimate, since it is valid to move from a characterisation
qualified in a way which neither takes back part of it nor reduces it in degree, to that
characterisation without any qualification at all.
But ‘really’ is a qualification which neither takes back a part nor reduces it in degree.
Therefore it follows from the supposition that the individual is the nature really,
that the individual difference is the nature.
We must therefore say that in the created world there is no such thing as a formal distinction;
rather, all things in the created world that are distinct are distinct really, and are
distinct things if each of them is a true thing.
So, just as in the created world we must always accept such argument schemata as: ‘This
is A, this is B, therefore B is A,’ or ‘This is not A, this is B, therefore B is not A,’
so, in the created world, we must always accept that things are distinct whenever they have
contradictory predicates (except in the case of different degrees of specificity, or of
incomplete symbols — but these do not apply here).
So we should agree with Aristotle, and say that in a particular substance nothing is
ultimately substantial except its particular form and its particular matter, or some compound
of the two.
Thus it is inconceivable that there should exist in Socrates a humanity or human nature
somehow distinct from Socrates, to which there is added a unique individual difference particularising
that nature.
Rather, any conceivable substantial existence in Socrates must be either his particular
matter, or his particular form, or some compound of the two.
Consequently, any essence, quiddity [‘whatness’] or whatever is constitutive of substance,
if it exists really outside the mind, must either be (a) simply and absolutely matter,
form, or a compound of both; or (b) a separated immaterial substance, as postulated by the Aristotelians.