Last week, we saw the final conclusion to the Battle of Buna-Gona, one of the
bloodiest engagements of the New Guinea Campaign,
and we also saw the reduction of the Gifu, the last Japanese strongpoint around Mount Austen.
With General Patch’s initial phase of his January offensive concluded, the Japanese
now face annihilation as the Americans are set to continue their advance westward.
Only Operation KE, the planned evacuation of this Island of Death, can save them; but this
would inevitably lead to another confrontation between the IJN and the US Navy. Thus, join us as
we delve into the Battle of Rennell Island and the leadup to the Japanese Evacuation of Guadalcanal.
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By January 13, the situation looked bleak for the 17th Army. Facing a full American offensive aimed
at destroying their forces, the Japanese had to weigh in three different options: to mount
an aggressive defense risking a quick collapse; to conduct a cautious defense and prolong the
struggle as long as possible; or to implement the gyokusai strategy, which consisted of launching
a massed attack either in the coastal area or inland with the objective of [capturing?] the
enemy headquarters. As the 17th Army eventually decided to try to prolong the defense while
holding on to a portion of the island, an express run was launched on January 14 to aid them,
bringing provisions, the Yano Battalion and the orders for the withdrawal. The Yano Battalion,
which was to conduct the rearguard during Operation KE, consisted of 750 replacements
for the 230th Regiment and was led by Major Yano Keiji, an expert in rearguard actions.
Heavy weather shrouded the nine destroyers of the Reinforcement Unit, now under the command
of Admiral Kimura , so they would land their load at Cape Esperance without problem, though on the
way back they would suffer a heavy air attack . At dawn on January 15, the orders for the withdrawal
operation would finally be delivered to 17th Army Headquarters, with many staff officers protesting
that the army was in no condition to withdraw, that this action would betray those already
lost and those encircled, and that the withdrawal would be too costly to Japan in ships and planes.
For them, it was better that the 17th Army sacrifice itself as a last service to the nation,
but the orders came from the Emperor and thus had to be carried out begrudgingly.
Meanwhile, by January 16, General Patch had distributed his plan for the next
phase of his offensive, aimed at a line from Hill 87 that angled northeast to the beach.
For the coastal front, the 6th Marines and the 182nd and 147th Regiments were
selected to secure the area of Hills 94 and 93, forming the unique and hybrid Composite
Army-Marine Division ; while further south, the 25th Division of General Collins was tasked with
an advance inland to seize Hills 87, 88 and 89 by enveloping or turning the enemy right flank.
Assuming that the Japanese would defend Hill 87 in force, Collins decided to send the 27th
Regiment to a narrow ridge called the “Snake”, from where the Americans would advance west to
attack the hill with the objective of drawing the main Japanese attention.
At the same time, the 161st Regiment would mount the main effort through a deep envelopment from
the Galloping Horse to the southwest, tasked with quickly seizing Hills X, Y and Z and
then continuing northwest to outflank Hill 87 and directly capture Hills 88 and 89. On January 21,
the second phase of the offensive was thus launched, with the 2nd Battalion, 161st Regiment
easily occupying Hills X and Y against minor resistance and with the 27th Regiment preparing
to start its advance on the narrow front . But just as Colonel Clarence Orndorff was
planning to attack Hill 87 from Hill Y on the morning of January 22, the 1st Battalion,
27th Regiment started its advance after a devastating air bombardment of the enemy
positions, quickly crushing three Japanese machine-guns blocking the advance down the
Snake’s back and then successfully seizing Hill 87 as the Japanese only offered light resistance.
With its immediate objective fulfilled, Collins then ordered the 27th to continue the pursuit of
the enemy towards Kokumbona while the 161st was to capture Hill Z and then turn north to follow the
pursuit. By midday, the Americans had swiftly seized Hills 88 and 89, preparing to continue
their drive towards Hill 90. In the afternoon, the 1st Battalion would then shoot its way through
to ascend Hill 90, successfully capturing its crescent as well as that of Hill 91 by nightfall.
These developments completely threw Japanese plans into turmoil, with the 17th Army immediately
ordering a withdrawal to Cape Esperance. As the 38th Division began to extricate its units,
the 2nd Division of General Maruyama, reinforced with the Yano Battalion, suddenly saw itself
threatened by the CAM Division on the coast and the 25th Division on its flank. Because of this,
in the early hours of January 23, Maruyama decided to pull back and abandon Kokumbona . Concurrently,
since January 22, the 6th Marines had been pushing along the beach and encountering stiff resistance,
but with the withdrawal of the 2nd Division, the Americans began to roll westwards on January 23.
At the same time, the 27th Regiment launched a two-pronged attack on its sector, with its
3rd Battalion rapidly seizing Hills 98 and 99. Upon capturing the latter, the 1st Battalion was
released to attack Kokumbona, successfully probing forward to the high ground and capturing the main
Japanese base by the early afternoon. In a day and a half, the 1st Battalion had advanced 7000
yards through the jungle at the loss of 73 men to fully fulfill all of Patch’s original objectives.
By nightfall, the 6th Marines were attacking the Japanese forces that had failed to withdraw,
and on January 24, the last remnants of the Japanese defenders would be annihilated on a
ridge just east of Kokumbona. With the linkup of the 25th and CAM Divisions, General Patch then
decided to narrow his front as he believed that an enemy counteroffensive was looming on the horizon;
but although the terrain beyond the Poha River was to the advantage of the defenders, the 6th
Marines and the 27th Regiment were to continue the pursuit. In turn, the Japanese kept their
withdrawal westwards, establishing Coast Defense Units from the sick and wounded and deploying
the Yano Battalion along the Marmura River by January 25. Encountering independent groups of
enemy units, the 27th Regiment had to stop short of the Poha on January 25, but the 6th Marines
would continue forward along the coast, finally engaging the Yano Battalion the following day.
Yano would offer fierce and strong resistance against the enemy attacks, successfully delaying
the American advance for two days and finally withdrawing behind the Bonegi River by January 29.
On January 30, the 147th Regiment took over the pursuit but its advance stalled at the Bonegi as
it faced heavy opposition, although the defenders would also describe considerable losses among its
forces during this time. Finally, the Japanese would continue their withdrawal westwards during
the night and the 147th would finally cross the Bonegi by February 1. But as the land
offensive was happening, there were also other developments unfolding at sea. By January 23,
Admiral Halsey had decided to carry out an air bombardment of Munda and a naval bombardment
of the Vila-Stanmore area on Kolombangara, where a new Japanese airfield was being constructed. Thus,
Admiral Ainsworth was instructed to conduct another bombardment with his vessels,
this time from the Kula Gulf. After cunningly slipping away from Japanese aircraft, Ainsworth
successfully fired nearly 2000 6-inch shells with his two cruisers and another 1500 rounds of 5-inch
with his destroyers , inflicting heavy material damage on Kolombangara and effectively delaying
the Japanese construction effort . Ainsworth would then withdraw at full speed, managing to avoid any
enemy retaliation . Meanwhile, as a prelude to Operation KE, the Japanese staged an air
superiority campaign with three major daylight attacks set for January 25, 27 and 30 and with
night harassment raids of three to ten aircraft to Guadalcanal, Port Moresby and Espiritu Santo.
The January 25 attack, with 76 Zeros and 18 G4M Bettys, was very disappointing,
losing five aircraft and suffering heavy damage on many more without any apparent gain.
The next attack, carried by 9 Ki-48 bombers, 74 Ki-43 fighters and 2 Ki-46 reconnaissance planes
of the 6th Air Division on January 27, fared much better, successfully taking down two P-38s, four
P-40s and a Wildcat to the loss of six Ki-43. Yet overall, the results were similarly disappointing.
In the meantime, due to the Japanese accumulation of resources in the South Pacific for Operation
KE, the Americans had been led to believe that another major enemy offensive was incoming.
In response to this threat, Admiral Halsey virtually deployed all his vessels in the area,
determined to deal a crushing blow to the IJN before a counterattack could even be started.
Thus, near sunset on January 29, a total of six task forces had been sent to the Southern
Solomons area, including two fleet carriers, two escort carriers, three battleships,
12 cruisers and 25 destroyers, with the objective of covering the relief of the
2nd Marine Division but also of luring and defeating the enemy navy in a decisive battle.
Rear-Admiral Robert Giffen commanded the new Task Force 18, which was a newcomer to the South
Pacific that had just arrived after participating in Operation Torch in the North African Campaign.
Giffen was a rigid by-the-book commander that disdained Halsey’s spontaneity and permissive
attitude , and on the night of January 29, he was wholly focused on complying with a directive from
Halsey to rendezvous off Cape Hunter with the four destroyers of the Cactus Striking Force , a
task that forced him to detach his two escort carriers to up his speed. Once these units merged,
Giffen would then lead a daylight sweep up the Slot as the last four transports with
Army replacements discharged at Lunga on January 30. Unfortunately for him, as a submarine had
detected the American force, Admiral Kusaka had decided in the afternoon to send 16 G3M and 16
G4M bombers from Rabaul to practice their mastery of a new tactic: night aerial torpedo attacks.
Giffen was not expecting to be hit by an air attack; instead, his main concern was the heavy
submarine activity in the area, so he decided to adopt an anti-submarine formation , with his
cruisers in two columns spaced 2500 yards apart and with his destroyers spread along a semicircle
2 miles ahead of the cruiser columns. Furthermore, although his detached escort carriers put up
groups of Wildcats and TBFs for air defense, the overcast would frustrate their attempts
to police the skies. Meanwhile, the two Japanese aircraft groups closed in from the west but then
decided to circle around astern of their prey to gain the black backdrop of the eastern sky.
At sunset, as Task Force 18 zigzagged northwest 50 miles north of Rennell Island and 160 miles south
of Guadalcanal, several of Giffen’s ships started to detect the incoming enemy aircraft; yet as the
admiral had previously insisted on maintaining absolute radio silence, Giffen decided not to
give any orders in regards to these contacts. Thus, at 19:19, the Japanese attack started, with
the 16 G4Ms of Lieutenant Nakamura Tomoo falling on the unsuspecting American vessels. Nakamura’s
bombers would miss all their torpedoes, however, with one aircraft splashing astern of Chicago and
with only one possible dud getting scored over Louisville. Despite this, Giffen refused to alter
his task force speed nor course, hell-bent on making his rendezvous, and even ordering
his ships to stop the zigzagging. This simplified the task of the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft,
which began dropping flares and float-lights to mark the course and speed of the American forces.
With this data at hand, Lieutenant-Commander Higai Joji started an attack with his 15 G3M bombers at
about 19:38. Although Higai perished in the attack along with another bomber, two torpedoes would
successfully hit the Chicago, causing heavy damage and bringing the cruiser to a stop.
In response, Giffen did not see fit to change course 180 degrees until 20:08,
with Louisville slowly taking the crippled Chicago under tow away from the battle area.
But Halsey immediately stepped in and decided to send the destroyer Sands and the tug Navajo to
relieve Louisville, while he also ordered the carrier Enterprise to augment the air
patrol over Task Force 18. Search planes from Rabaul would continue to hunt for the American
vessels on the morning of January 30, and as Admiral Kusaka learned of Giffen’s withdrawal,
he decided to send another airstrike in daylight to finish off the Chicago. By midday,
11 G4M bombers under Lieutenant-Commander Nishioka Kazuo, based at Kavieng and staging through Buka,
had lifted off to strike at the crippled cruiser. Australian coastwatchers in the Solomons and
radio intelligence experts, however, quickly discovered this prospect and informed Halsey,
who decided to order Giffen to make for Efate with his battle-worthy cruisers.
Thus, at 15:00, Giffen left the Chicago covered by six destroyers and hauled off to the east,
stripping Chicago of the formidable defense of the anti-aircraft batteries of his other cruisers and
taking with him most of the air cover. By 15:40, there were only 10 Wildcats on air patrol over
Enterprise, with four of them drifting 40 miles to chase and shoot down a G4M scout bomber.
Nishioka’s bombers initially appear to have gone after Enterprise, then about 40 miles southeast
of Chicago; but upon spotting the Wildcats on air patrol that were waiting to intercept them, the
Japanese decided to turn to attack the crippled cruiser, which lacked aerial defenders except for
four fighters that were chasing the striking group as it entered the anti-aircraft fire from the
escorting destroyers. Though two of the bombers would be shot down before they could release their
ordnance, Nishioka’s bombers would successfully release their torpedoes in less than a minute.
Four hits would be immediately scored over Chicago, causing such tremendous damage that the
cruiser had to be abandoned and would finally sink 20 minutes later, with the loss of 62 crewmembers.
Another torpedo would also hit the LaVallette, inflicting heavy damage
on the destroyer and killing 21 or 22 of her crew. During these furious seconds,
six more of Nishioka’s bombers would be shot down after dropping their load and, after
failing to locate the remaining ships, only four Bettys would be able to limp back to Shortland.
With the sinking of Chicago, the Navajo would then take LaVallette under tow,
and it would successfully save the destroyer thanks to its efforts. With the disastrous
conclusion of the Battle of Rennell Island, Admiral Nimitz was left fuming and frustrated,
directly blaming Giffen for the loss of Chicago . The Japanese, meanwhile, widely publicized the
results of these engagements, believing to have sunk a battleship and three cruisers. But most
importantly, Admiral Kusaka was relieved to know that one of the enemy task forces had departed
the area, leaving the Americans with less naval strength for the incoming first evacuation run.
Next week, we’ll continue to cover the continuation of the evacuation of Guadalcanal,
as Operation KE is set into motion and the Guadalcanal Campaign is finally brought to
its epic conclusion, so make sure you are subscribed and have pressed the bell button
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