Over the last few years, the probability of military confrontation between Taiwan and
China has increased many folds.
During a speech to commemorate the Communist Party's 100-year anniversary in 2021, Chinese
President Xi Jinping stated, "Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing
China's complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment" of the
party.
This year, Xi said on the opening day of the week-long key once-in-a-five-year Congress
of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), "We will not renounce the use of force and
will take all necessary measures to stop all separatist movements" in Taiwan
Now Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has war-gamed the a Chinese
Invasion of Taiwan and released its findings titled as The First Battle of the Next War.
In this video Defense Updates analyzes what American think tank believes will be the outcome
of chinese invasion of Taiwan In 2026 ? Let’s get started.
CSIS reports tells regarding the outcome,
“The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s
navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities.
Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts
any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island.
Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious
craft and civilian rollon, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land
behind the beachheads.
However, in the most likely “base scenario,” the Chinese invasion quickly founders.
Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where
the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland.
Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense
Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet.
China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result: Taiwan
remains autonomous.
There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate.
If Taiwan surrenders before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.
This defense comes at a high cost.
The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands
of service members.
Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years.
While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a
damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services.
China also suffers heavily.
Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of
soldiers are prisoners of war.“
CSIS analysis of the 24 game iterations showed 4 necessary conditions to defeat a Chinese
invasion and are as follows:
1.
Taiwanese forces must hold the line.
Recommendation: Strengthen Taiwanese ground forces.
Because some Chinese forces will always land on the island, Taiwanese ground forces must
be able to contain any beachhead and then counterattack forcefully as Chinese logistics
weaken.
However, the Taiwanese ground forces have severe weaknesses.
Therefore, Taiwan must fill its ranks and conduct rigorous, combined arms training.
Ground forces must become the center of Taiwan’s defense effort.
2.
There is no “Ukraine model” for Taiwan.
Recommendation: In peacetime, the United States and Taiwan must work together to provide Taiwan
with the weapons it needs; in wartime, if the United States decides to defend Taiwan,
U.S. forces must quickly engage in direct combat.
In the Ukraine war, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
have not sent troops directly into combat but have sent massive amounts of equipment
and supplies to Ukraine.
Russia has been unable to interdict this overland flow.
However, the “Ukraine model” cannot be replicated in Taiwan because China can isolate
the island for weeks or even months.
Taiwan must start the war with everything it needs.
Further, delays and half measures by the United States would make the defense harder, increase
U.S. casualties, allow China to create a stronger lodgment, and raise the risk of escalation.
3.
The United States must be able to use its bases in Japan for combat operations.
Recommendation: Deepen diplomatic and military ties with Japan.
While other allies (e.g., Australia and South Korea) are important in the broader competition
with China and may play some role in the defense of Taiwan, Japan is the linchpin.
Without the use of U.S. bases in Japan, U.S. fighter/attack aircraft cannot effectively
participate in the war
4.
The United States must be able to strike the Chinese fleet rapidly and en masse from outside
the Chinese defensive zone.
Recommendation: Increase the arsenal of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles.
Bombers capable of launching standoff, anti-ship ordnance offer the fastest way to defeat the
invasion with the least amount of U.S. losses.
Procuring such missiles and upgrading existing missiles with this anti-ship capability needs
to be the top procurement priority.
CSIS notes that Victory is not everything.
It states, “The United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suffering more in the long
run than the “defeated” Chinese.
Furthermore, the perception of high costs might undermine deterrence: if China believes
that the United States would be unwilling to bear the high costs of defending Taiwan,
then China might risk an invasion.
The United States should therefore institute policies and programs to make winning less
costly in the event of conflict.”
CSIS recommended specific measures to prevent a Pyrrhic Victory.
Some of key ones are as follows:
1.
Do not plan on striking the mainland.
The National Command Authority might withhold permission because of the grave risks of escalation
with a nuclear power.
2.
Recognize the need to continue operations in the face of heavy casualties.
In three weeks, the United States will suffer about half as many casualties as it did in
20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
3.
Move Taiwanese air and naval forces toward asymmetry.
Despite rhetoric about adopting a “porcupine strategy,” Taiwan still spends most of its
defense budget on expensive ships and aircraft that China will quickly destroy.
4.
Fortify and expand air bases in Japan and Guam.
Dispersion and hardening dilute the effects of missile attacks.
5 . Revise U.S. Air Force doctrine and restructure procurement to increase aircraft survivability
on the ground.
90% of aircraft losses occurred on the ground.
6.
Do not plan on overflying the Chinese mainland.
Chinese air defense is too strong, the targets take a long time to produce operational results,
and the air missions around Taiwan take priority.
7.
Shift to smaller, more survivable ships and develop rescue mechanisms to deal with crippled
ships and multiple sinkings.
Surface ships are extremely vulnerable, with the United States typically losing two carriers
and 10 to 20 large surface combatants in game iterations.
8.
Prioritize submarines and other undersea platforms.
Submarines were able to enter the Chinese defensive zone and wreak havoc with the Chinese
fleet, but numbers were inadequate.
9.
Continue development and fielding of hypersonic weapons but recognize that they are niche
weapons.
Their high cost limits inventories, so they lack the volume needed to counter the immense
numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms.
10.
Prioritize sustainment of the bomber fleet over fighters.
The range, missile standoff distance, and high carrying capacity of bombers presented
the People’s Liberation Army with daunting challenges.
11.
Produce more, cheaper fighters and balance the acquisition of stealth aircraft with production
of non-stealth aircraft.
With so many aircraft lost early in the conflict, the Air Force risks running out of fighter/attack
aircraft and becoming a secondary player in the conflict unless it has a large enough
force to sustain the losses.
While CSIS itself notes, that the project and its recommendations need some caveats
and Modeling an invasion does not imply that it is inevitable or even probable, this is
a very insightful report.
It also notes that instead of outright invasion Chinese leadership could adopt a strategy
of diplomatic isolation, gray zone pressure, or economic coercion against Taiwan; even
if China opts for military force, this might take the form of a blockade rather than an
outright invasion.
In any case the report provides crucial inputs and policy makers and military leaders should
take a note of this.
We have provided the link to the report in the Description section so that interested
viewers can go though the full report.