The Middle East is changing whether we want it to or not.
The more Iran is allowed to direct the transformation of the Middle East, the more the region is
likely to emerge worse off—more violent, chaotic, and aligned against U.S. interests.
It is incumbent upon the United States to confront Iran in order to stop them from threatening
America’s allies, exacerbating conflict and undermining America’s interests in the region
The Trump Administration’s strategy, so far, focuses exclusively on the Iranian nuclear
threat.
But to achieve America’s goals, Trump must take major steps to address the problems of
the Middle East in ways that suit both American and Arab interests.
Syria and Iraq furnish the best opportunities to do so.
In Syria, Iran has tied itself to the unpopular and incompetent Assad regime.
In support of Assad, Iran may have lost as many as 2,000 troops, including several high-ranking
generals.
Thousands of Iranian-backed militia men from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon have died as
well.
Financially, Tehran has funneled billions of dollars to prop up the Assad regime.
But Iran’s rickety economy can’t keep up with these expenses and Iran’s efforts
in Syria are increasingly unpopular at home.
However, Iran cannot simply leave Syria.
Iran fears (probably rightly) that allowing the Syrian regime to succumb to the Sunni
opposition will endanger Hizballah’s control of Lebanon and Iran’s entire position in
the Levant.
The United States should take advantage of Iran’s vulnerability in Syria.
We should pursue a similar strategy to the one adopted in Afghanistan in the 1980s, when
the US armed mujahedeen fighters to oppose the Soviet-backed Afghani government, draining
their resources, and eventually forcing the Soviets out of the country.
For this strategy to work, the U.S. must be willing to arm, train, and supply a larger
number of Syrian oppositionists, virtually anyone other than ISIS or al-Qaeda who is
willing to fight the Assad regime.
This strategy would serve multiple goals.
It would force the Iranians to waste resources defending Syria.
It would further strain the Iranian economy and the regime’s grip on power, which might
make Tehran more willing to compromise on other issues, like Yemen, or Iraq.
Eventually, it could force the Iranians (and Russians) to jettison Assad and agree to a
new, federalized Syrian political system.
This is the best possible outcome for the United States in Syria, and one served at
a low cost.
Iran’s interests in Iraq are deep and wide.
The two states share a 1,400 kilometer border.
Their societies are deeply intertwined.
Their annual trade exceeds $12 billion, and in the 1980s the two countries fought the
longest conventional war of the 20th century, with nearly half a million killed altogether.
This makes the stability, security and the geopolitical alignment of Iraq a key interest
of Iran that the United States must exploit.
Although Iran has made sizable gains in Iraq, its dominance is far from complete and many
Iraqis don’t want to live under Iranian hegemony.
The more independent Iraq is, the less Iran would be able to use Iraq as a conduit to
the rest of the Arab world.
If the US is willing to make a long-term commitment to Iraq, there is good reason to believe that
Iraq will become strong and independent, which would greatly reduce, (but not eliminate),
Iran’s influence there.
Here’s what the U.S. should do: Iraq’s military must be built into a force that can
maintain the peace.
Currently, Baghdad has no choice but to cede control of its security to Iranian-backed
Shi’a militias.
Without a continued American presence of (ideally) 10,000 troops to train, advise and supply
Iraq’s security forces, Iraq will increasingly have to rely on Tehran’s proxies or else
slide back into fragmentation and renewed civil strife.
On the financial side, Iraq needs to be more economically independent from Iran.
A long-term American economic aid program of (ideally) $1–2 billion per year would
reinforce to Iraqis that the United States is making a long-term commitment to its stability
and development.
Eventual regime change in Iran will probably be necessary because the current regime insists
on defining the United States as its adversary no matter how hard Washington tries to befriend
it.
However, regime change should not be the immediate or core goal of American policy.
My strategy will be challenging enough.
Instead, the US should actively develop its capabilities to wage both cyber and unconventional
warfare in Iran, and reserve these tools as a deterrent.
If the Iranian regime knows that the United States has a strong capability to threaten
its grip on power through covert means, they are unlikely to become too aggressive in fighting
back against a new American pushback strategy.
Finally, for this strategy to work, the United States cannot aggressively attack Iran everywhere.
It won’t be possible given the limited resources Americans are likely to be willing to commit,
and there are places where we are more vulnerable than Iran is.
The Iranian nuclear program is one of those areas because most of the world still backs
the JCPOA.
Even now, if the United States refrains from taking steps that could start a trade war
with our allies over their commercial ties with Iran, we could preserve both the international
consensus to stifle Irans nuclear aspirations and prevent Tehran from restarting its enrichment
activities.
Achieving America’s goals of confronting Iran in Syria and Iraq requires significant
resources and planning.
But by driving up the cost of Iranian expansionism in Syria, and reinforcing Iraq as an American
ally, the United States will significantly undermine Iran’s goal of spreading its anti-American
agenda throughout the Middle East.