Never has the balance of power changed so much in so little time than at the Battle of Midway. In
the space of just 5 minutes American dive bombers scored hits on three Japanese aircraft carriers
dramatically turning the tide of the war in the Pacific. But this pivotal moment was a product
of more than chance. It was the culmination of decisions made not only in the heat of battle,
but in the preceding weeks and months. To truly grasp the significance of this
juncture and just how it happened, we have to go right back to the beginning of the Pacific War.
On the 7th of December 1941 Japan launched a devastating surprise attack on the US Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor. They wanted to cripple US Naval power and buy time for their forces to
capture important resources in Southeast Asia. And it worked, by March 1942 Japan had secured a huge
chunk of territory and become a global power. But there was a problem American aircraft carriers.
At the beginning of the Pacific War Japan had six large carriers and five smaller ones while the US
had only three large carriers in the theater, with four more in the Atlantic. However all
three were absent during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japan knew they had little chance of
defeating the United States in a long war. To avoid one they planned to draw the American
carriers into battle near Midway atoll. There they could finish the job and end the war.
Japan's plan to attack the US Navy at Midway was based around the strategy
of destroying the US Pacific Fleet which they had tried and ultimately failed to
do during their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 6 months earlier. As part of this,
securing the island of Midway would help form a first line of defense in the Pacific Ocean. Not
only shielding Japan's forces operating in Asia, but also providing early warning of any American
movements in the Pacific. It might even force the United States into negotiated peace Japan hoped.
The threat from these American carriers was further reinforced by other engagements leading
up to the battle in April B-25s from the USS Hornet launched a daring raid on mainland Japan,
shocking the Japanese public. Then in May carriers from both sides went head-to-head
at the Battle of the Coral Sea, the world's first ever carrier battle. Though it was a
tactical victory for the Japanese, it had huge consequences for the upcoming fight at Midway.
The Japanese lost Shōhō while Shōkaku was badly damaged and Zuikaku lost most of
its aircraft. The US lost the Lexington while the Yorktown was badly damaged and in need of
repairs. However the Japanese believed that the Yorktown was out of action completely.
At the same time the US Naval Intelligence Section at Pearl
Harbor code named HYPO was winning its first major victory of the war.
From March 1942 HYPO began to see frequent mentions in decoded Japanese communications of
a planned attack on a location codenamed "AF" which US Navy Intelligence Officers suspected
could be Midway. To confirm this they developed a ruse to trick the Japanese. They ordered the
base at Midway to send out an unencrypted message saying they were running running out
of fresh water. The Japanese intercepted this and then sent out an intelligence
report on the 22nd of May stating that "AF" was running out of fresh water. This report was in
turn intercepted by US Naval intelligence confirming that "AF" was indeed Midway.
Now they knew where the attack would take place the US had to find out when. Luckily
only a few days later HYPO and FRUMEL in Australia learned the date of the attack and the Japanese
order of battle. These critical pieces of information were immediately passed
on to Admiral Chester Nimitz Commander in Chief of
the Pacific Fleet who began to make plans for how to counter the Japanese attack.
The Japanese plan would take place in stages. First, in concert with a diversionary attack on
the Aleutian Islands, four aircraft carriers under Vice Admiral Nagumo
would attack Midway from the Northwest. Next, with the island defences destroyed,
the invasion force of over 5,000 men under Vice Admiral Kondo would occupy Midway. This would
force the American carriers into battle. When they arrived from Pearl Harbor, a combination
of Nagumo's carriers and Yamamoto's battleships waiting further to the West would destroy them.
But Nimitz now aware of the attack had time to prepare an ambush of his own. But there was a
problem, Nimitz was outnumbered. He surged as many aircraft as he could to Midway Atoll.
Obsolete Brewster Buffalos, B-26 and B-17s and PBY Catalinas among others. He planned to place
his carriers to the northeast of Midway where they would launch a simultaneous attack on the
Japanese carriers with the land-based aircraft. But it still wasn't enough he needed more.
The answer was the USS Yorktown. Damaged at Coral Sea, the ship was estimated to need months
of repairs. But in a remarkable feat of engineering repair crews at Pearl
Harbor managed to prepare her for battle at Midway in just 72 hours. Unlike the Japanese,
who made little effort to replace Zuikaku's aircraft. Yorktown's air group was cobbled
together from whatever was available. Enterprise and Hornet formed one US task
force with Yorktown forming the other. Vice Admiral Fletcher, the only US Commander with
experience of a carrier battle was placed in overall charge. It was a huge turning point.
Without the Yorktown the US Navy would have been outnumbered by the Japanese Navy's carrier-based
aircraft. Instead, with Yorktown back and the land based aircraft on Midway Island itself,
the US held a small advantage over the Japanese Navy in terms of aircraft available. And this is
why the Bttle of the Coral Sea was so significant. If the US Navy had not put the Shōkaku and Zuikaku
out of action they would have found themselves facing an additional 144 Japanese aircraft.
Furthermore, the crews of the Yorktown were the only US carrier personnel with any experience of
a carrier battle. At Midway they would get the chance to put that experience to use.
The Battle of Midway began on the 3rd of June 1942 when a US Navy Catalina first
cited Kondo's invasion force heading towards Midway. The US quickly dispatched a flight
of B-17s and more Catalinas to attack the fleet, but they had little effect. Still
the sighting confirmed that US intelligence was correct and that they had the element of
surprise. Nagumo had just seven scouting aircraft available to him, the Americans had over 30.
Right now I'm standing in front of a Canadian Vickers PBY Catalina at IWM Duxford. Essentially
a flying boat, Catalinas like this one were using in a variety of maritime roles during
the Second World War and played an important part in the Battle of Midway. This one is
the only flying Catalina outside of the Americas, owned by Catalina Aircraft Ltd,
operated by Plane Sailing Air Displays ltd and supported by the Catalina Society,
The early warnings provided by these Catalinas ensured that the defences of Midway were ready
for the Japanese attacks and gave American commanders the location of the Japanese
carriers and where they were headed allowing them to launch their strikes with a degree of accuracy.
At 4:30 a.m. the next morning the Japanese launched search aircraft of their own as
well as their first attack wave of 108 aircraft bound for Midway. The remainder of their aircraft
were held in reserve in case American aircraft carriers appeared. But while the raiders were
enroute two of the Japanese carriers were spotted by an American Catalina. In response 52 American
aircraft of various types took off from Midway to attack the Japanese carriers. Their attack
would have to take place unescorted as the fighters were needed to defend Midway. However
those fighters were largely obsolete aircraft. When they intercepted the Japanese attack Force
at 6:20 they were cut to pieces by experienced Japanese pilots in their tried and tested Zeros.
This is the cockpit section of Mitsubishi A6M Zero. At the time of its introduction in 1940 it
was arguably the best carrier-based fighter among the Second World War belligerents. Its speed and
manoeuvrability in combat were its main advantages along with its very long range of 1,160 miles. The
Zero outclassed its main rival in the Pacific the Grumman F4F Wildcat in traditional dogfighting
having a superior turn radius and faster rate of climb, but lacked the sufficient armor and
self-sealing fuel tanks which Wildcats did have. Wildcat pilots would soon develop tactics that
helped maximize its advantages and improve its record against the Zero in the air. However
Zeros would still go on to claim many American aircraft and lives during the Battle of Midway.
Having survived the American fighters largely intact, the Japanese struck Midway. Braving a
wall of anti-aircraft fire they pummelled the atoll for 15 minutes, but the damage done was
light. As they withdrew to their carriers Japanese Pilots informed the Nagumo that another raid was
needed to neutralise the Island's defences. Believing there were no American carriers in
the area, Nagumo soon chose to rearm his reserve aircraft to carry out a second strike on Midway.
At 7:00 Admiral Fletcher chose to launch his aircraft from Enterprise and Hornet at the
two Japanese carriers that had been sighted. Yorktown's aircraft were held in reserve in
case any more appeared. However this launch was poorly coordinated and directed. Any aircraft
that would arrive would be attacking piecemeal and without fighter support.
At 7:10 the first American aircraft from Midway began their attacks on the Japanese
carriers. They took heavy losses and scored no hits but the Japanese carriers were forced to
take evasive action. Something they would continue to do over the next hour as more
Midway based aircraft arrived. At 7:40 around half an hour into his rearmament process Nagumo
received some alarming news, a scout aircraft had spotted 10 American surface ships to the
northeast of his position he immediately cancelled the rearmament order and awaited more information.
Meanwhile the attacks on his fleet continued. But both the US aircraft based on Midway and the
nearby American submarine Nautilus were unable to score a single hit on the Japanese Fleet.
Nagumo dispatched the destroyer Arashi to hunt for the sub and contemplated what he should do next.
Admiral Nagumo now essentially had two options. He could send his 36 available Val dive bombers
to launch a strike on the American carriers, but this had two problems. First they would be
without fighter escort making it an incredibly risky attack. Second the strike force which he
had sent to attack Midway were now returning and needed to land before they ran out of fuel. If he
sent out his dive bombers to attack the American carriers, which would take at least 30 minutes to
get them into the air, it meant that his returning aircraft would likely have to ditch in the sea.
Nagumo's other option was to clear the decks of his carriers and let the returning aircraft land,
refuel and rearm. Once that had all been completed he could launch a full coordinated strke against
the American carriers. Although this would follow Japanese naval doctrine it would take much more
time and leave his carriers vulnerable with fully armed and fueled up aircraft presenting
a tantalizing target for US naval aviators. In the end Nagumo chose the second option.
While Nagumo was landing his strike aircraft Fletcher was doubling down. Having received
no further reports he launched his reserve from Yorktown around 9:00
a.m. Unlike Enterprise and Hornet these aircraft formed up in the air above the
carrier before heading out and had experienced airmen at the controls.
Meanwhile Nagumo was confident. He altered his course and headed straight for the American
carriers. He simply needed 30 minutes to spot his aircraft on the flight decks and launch
them in the attack, but little did he know American aircraft were bearing down on him.
Hornet and Enterprise's formations were already uncoordinated, but having changed direction,
the Japanese carriers were not where they were expected to be. Thus over the next hour
the Japanese faced yet more piecemeal attacks from American torpedo bombers of Hornet and Enterprise.
For the aircrew flying the TBD Devastated a torpedo bomber at Midway the odds of returning
from a strike were incredibly slim. Devastators were slow and their method of attack required them
to fly low and straight making them easy targets for both anti-aircraft gunners and Zero pilots.
Tragically this was the case at Midway, with only six out of 41 Devastators making it back
to their carriers. One of the squadrons, Torpedo Squadron 8 from the USS Hornet, lost 15 out of
its 15 Devastators during their attack on the Japanese carriers Ensign George gay was the only
survivor of the 30 air crew who took part in the strike and was picked up by a Catalina like this.
But these airmen's sacrifice was not for nothing. Nagumo could not spot and launch his strike force
while under attack himself. As the deck was needed for his Combat Air Patrol,
the fighters that defended his carriers. So while the Devastators had taken heavy losses,
they delayed Nagumo's strike and exhausted the Japanese Combat Air Patrol. In doing so
they set the stage for one of the most fateful 5 minutes in military history.
At 10 minutes past 10 Yorktown's torpedo bombers attacked from the east, this time
with accompanying escort fighters. Their attack pulled the Japanese Combat Air Patrol towards
them. Meanwhile, far above, American dive bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise were closing in
from the Northeast and Southwest. Yorktown's Squadron had flown with the torpedo bombers,
but selected an alternate attack path. While Enterprise's squadrons,
who had failed to find the Japanese earlier, had turned North on a hunch and followed the
Arashi as it returned to its post. At 10:25 all three dive bomber squadrons
arrived simultaneously over Nagumo's Fleet with a clear shot at the Japanese carriers.
Over the following 5 minutes Kaga took four hits, Sōryū three and the flagship Akagi took one. This
might have been manageable, but the armed and fuelled strike aircraft in the Japanese
hangers below caused a chain reaction that crippled all three carriers. Soon,
choked by flames, the crews were forced to scuttle their ship.
As the American aircraft withdrew Nagumo finally had the chance to launch the attack he'd been
preparing for since the early morning. Over the course of two attacks Japanese dive bombers and
torpedo bombers from Hiryū achieved multiple hits on the USS Yorktown and the ship was
abandoned at 3p.m. Finally, in the last major action of the day, dive bombers from Enterprise
attacked the Hiryū achieving four hits. She would sink at 9:00 a.m. the following day.
With four out of six of their fleet carriers sunk, Japan's naval capability was crippled in
a theater that came to be dominated by carrier operations. By contrast,
America would use its vast industrial resources to expand its naval power. The American victory
at Midway therefore was a huge pivotal turning point that put a permanent halt to Japan's Pacific
strategy and allowed the US and its Allies to go on the offensive. It was also a massive morale
boost for the US Navy and America in general. Four out of the six carriers that were used
to attack Pearl Harbor were at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean and America was on the ascendency.