In the Preface to the Prolegomena, Kant describes his project and its significance and its relation
to prior thinkers.
Since Kant is fairly clear in his presentation, I'm going to give you the text of the Preface,
pausing occasionally for my comments.
I'm also going to put my notes up on the screen as I read.
Here we go.
These Prolegomena are not for the use of pupils but of future teachers, and even the latter
should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made
science, but merely for the discovery of the science itself.
There are scholars for whom the history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is philosophy
itself; for these the present Prolegomena are not written.
They must wait till those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself have
completed their work; it will then be the turn of such scholars to inform the world
of what has been done.
Unfortunately, nothing can be said which, in their opinion, has not been said before,
and truly the same prophecy applies to all future time; for since the human reason has
for many centuries speculated upon innumerable objects in various ways, it is hardly to be
expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old
sayings of past ages.
My object is to persuade all those who think metaphysics worth studying that it is absolutely
necessary to pause a moment and, disregarding all that has been done, to propose first the
preliminary question, "Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible?"
If it is a science, how does it happen that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal
and permanent recognition?
If not, how can it maintain its pretensions and keep the human understanding in suspense
with hopes never ceasing, yet never fulfilled?
Whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field, we must come
once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called science, which
cannot possibly remain on its present footing.
It seems almost ridiculous, while every other science is continually advancing, that in
this, which pretends to be wisdom incarnate for whose oracle every one inquires, we should
constantly move round the same spot, without gaining a single step.
And so its supporters having melted away, we do not find that men who are confident
of their ability to shine in other sciences venture their reputation here, where everybody,
however ignorant in other matters, presumes to deliver a final verdict, inasmuch as in
this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish soundness from
shallow talk.
After all, it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a science, when men begin
to wonder how far it has advanced, that the question should at last occur as to whether
and how in general such a science is possible?
Human reason so delights in constructions that it has several times built up a tower
and then razed it to examine the nature of the foundation.
It is never too late to become reasonable and wise; but if the insight comes late, there
is always more difficulty in starting the change.
The question whether a science be possible presupposes a doubt as to its actuality.
But such a doubt offends the man whose entire goods may perhaps consist in this supposed
jewel; hence he who raises the doubt must expect opposition from all sides.
Some, in the proud consciousness of their possessions, which are ancient and therefore
considered legitimate, will take their metaphysical compendia in their hands and look down on
him with contempt; others who never see anything except it be identical with what they have
somewhere else seen before will not understand him, and everything will remain for a time
as if nothing had happened to excite the concern or the hope for an impending change.
Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the independent reader of these Prolegomena will
not only doubt his previous science but ultimately be fully persuaded that it cannot exist unless
the demands here stated on which its possibility depends be satisfied; and, as this has never
been done, that there is, as yet, no such thing as metaphysics.
But as it can never cease to be in demand--since the interests of human reason in general are
intimately interwoven with it--he must confess that a radical reform, or rather a rebirth
of the science according to a new plan, is unavoidable, however much men may struggle
against it for a while.