“The enemy holds the same entrenched camp of Breslau which my troops defended so honourably.
I am marching to attack this position.
The decisive moment is approaching.
Contrary to every rule of war, I shall attack the army under the command of Prince Charles
even though it is three times my own strength wherever and whenever I may meet it.
The number of the foe, the strength of their position, are here matters of but secondary
importance.
All these must yield, I feel confident, before the unflinching bravery of my troops and the
judicious execution of my orders.
I must venture on this step, or all is lost.
We must beat the foe or be buried beneath their batteries.
I have no need to explain my conduct or why I am determined on this measure.
I fully recognise the dangers attached to this enterprise, but in my present situation,
I must conquer or die.
If we go under, all is lost.
Bear in mind, gentlemen, that we shall be fighting for our glory, the preservation of
our homes, and for our wives and children.
If anybody prefers to take his leave, he can have it now, but he will cease to have any
claim on my benevolence.
In late November, dispatches reached Frederick of the Duke of Bevern’s retreat after the
Battle of Breslau.
Frederick was livid and ordered Bevern to relieve the city, or face capital punishment.
Within three days the remaining garrison surrendered Breslau, and Frederick learned the Austrians
captured Bevern.
All major Silesian strongholds, his exquisite defence against any invasion from the south,
were in Austrian hands.
Describing the situation as serious was an understatement.
His army camped at Parchwitz for a week, until December 4.
It became the central hub to collect the dispersed Prussian forces in the region, mainly Bevern’s
routed troops.
The days were short and the weather was freezing.
His army had marched some 300 kilometres in twelve days.
They finally enjoyed a well-deserved rest.
Despite the victory at Rossbach less than a month before, Frederick was not in an optimistic
mood.
It was during these days he arranged his Political Testament.
Additionally, he prepared the macabre arrangement “On what to do after the battle in case
I am killed.”
He considered his death a very likely outcome of the campaign.
Meanwhile, in the Austrian camp, Prince Charles learned of Frederick’s position at Parchwitz.
He figured, heavily outnumbering the Prussian King, this was the time to strike.
Disregarding advice for caution, he wanted to strike at Frederick fast to prevent him
from fortifying his position.
He sent the army’s bake ovens and a small corps ahead.
Asprey writes that Charles did not even consider the possibility of Frederick attacking him.
On December 2, Zieten’s column of demoralised soldiers arrived at Parchwitz.
The Prussian army numbered some 33.000, many of them battered, worn down and tired.
Of course, the army’s morale was strengthened by the soldier’s tales who fought at Rossbach.
And Frederick’s attitude towards his men certainly played a vital part.
“Frederick was never more close to his army than at Parchwitz: During these winter days,
the king camped in the open air like one of his private soldiers.
He used to warm himself at their fires, and then make room for others to take his place.
He talked with the soldiers as if they were of his own kind.
He sympathised with the travails which they had undergone, and, in the most friendly possible
way, he encouraged them to behave like heroes just once more."
(Professor Johann Georg Sulzer, in Volz, 1926-7, II, 120)
The constant desertions of forcibly enlisted Saxons and other uncommitted soldiers left
Frederick with a loyal, battle-hardened force.
On December 3, Frederick, himself approaching exhaustion, prepared the assault against the
Austrians.
He promised his drained men wealth and promotion.
He expected the Austrians to barricade themselves around Breslau, utilising its strong natural
fortifications.
In the early morning, of December 4, the Prussian army departed.
Skirmishes with Austrian hussars revealed the Austrian main army must be nearby, but
still nowhere to be seen.
It wasn’t until the evening that Frederick learned the Austrians abandoned the stronghold
around Breslau were within a day’s marching distance.
Frederick couldn’t believe his luck: the plain they held, was the same plain the Prussian
army conducted its autumn war games.
They knew it through and through.
That night, the Prussians camped weapon-in-hand, without fire.
It was freezing.
In the distance, they saw the enemies’ campfires.
Frederick fielded around 12.000 cavalry in 128 squadrons, slightly under 23.000 infantry,
and 160 artillery guns.
At four AM, the army awoke in silence and began their march in two infantry columns,
flanked by cavalry on either side.
Frederick rode among the vanguard with hussars and light Jager infantry.
When the morning mist faded, a wide, open plain, covered with light snow appeared.
Frederick could likely name every village in the region, allowing him to give his subordinates
clear instructions for deployment.
Frederick reached the village of Borne, where the Prussian cavalry engaged in a slight skirmish
against Austrian and Saxon hussars.
These were quickly routed, and 600 prisoners were taken.
Three infantry battalions held Borne, while Frederick climbed the Schon-berg.
Here, he saw the Austrian deployment.
A vast line, from north to south spanning some eight kilometres (four miles) faced him.
They had just finished deploying.
Earlier, the Austrians were marching when news of Frederick’s advance reached them.
It caught them by surprise.
Two lines extended from Nippern (Mrozow), to the south of Leuthen.
To the left rear, Nadasdy manned the reserves.
The Austrian army was significantly larger than Frederick expected.
Prince Charles commanded between 65 and 70.000 troops.
5000 of them were irregulars.
[Battle sequence] Asprey 508+
The Prussian vanguard's march towards Borne led Charles to believe the Prussians would
attack his right flank.
This flank was protected by the Zettelbusch, the only extensively wooded area of the plain.
Meanwhile, the Austrian left did not enjoy many natural defences.
In addition, the Sophienberg provided a perfect cover for his army to manoeuvre itself to
the Austrian south unnoticed.
For his plan to work, the Austrians had to be convinced Frederick was attacking their
well-defended right flank.
Frederick deployed one infantry and one cavalry unit in full view of the Austrians on the
right.
Charles saw these manoeuvres and called nine infantry battalions from the south to augment
his right flank between Nippern and Frobelwitz.
This was over an hour of hard marching away from the southern tip at Sagschutz.
As the Austrian infantry moved from south to north, the exact opposite happened behind
the hill.
It was past noon when the first Prussian columns reached Lobetinz, removed from the Austrians'
view.
The column swerved to their left, approaching the Austrian flank.
Zieten rode far in advance, towards the final line of march near the Schweidnitzer river.
With the Prussian columns moving into their positions, Frederick rode towards Radaxdorf
to observe the enemy.
Prince Charles noticed the Prussian manoeuvre, but initially figured it was a diversion.
He ordered the second line of infantry to break up and move to the south to augment
the southern-most lines.
These were held by German auxiliaries.
The mobile Prussian artillery positioned itself on the Glanzberg.
Around this time, Moritz of Anhalt Dessau warned Frederick that the mid-winter days
were very short, and it was already past noon.
Frederick agreed and gave the order to attack.
He warned all his regiments to advance slowly, leading to a textbook oblique order formation
with his right flank engaging in battle first.
The German auxiliaries at Sagschutz received the brunt of the damage.
Putting up surprisingly fierce resistance, they realised they were outnumbered and many
on the left flank broke.
Nadasdy countered Zieten’s charge, and fierce combat broke out to the south of Gohlau.
Meanwhile, the Prussian artillery opened fire, tearing into the Austrian lines.
Zieten’s cavalry proved to be too strong, and Nadasdy’s cavalry broke.
Charles realised he would not be able to remedy the southern flank with reserves.
He ordered his entire army to bend to the south.
The Austrians formed up in a line right through Leuthen.
Meanwhile, the mobile artillery deployed on the Butterberg and Judenberg, opening a devastating
volley of fire against the Austrian lines.
It was 3:30 PM when the second phase of the battle commenced.
The Prussians launched a renewed assault against the newly formed Austrian line.
The fiercest combat concentrated inside Leuthen, where savage door-to-door fighting broke out.
Some Prussian battalions were beaten back, but the Prussian artillery compensated by
opening a deafening barrage on the village.
After half an hour of fighting, the Prussians seized a burning Leuthen.
However, strong resistance behind the village continued.
Then, the Austrian cavalry swerved down from the Austrian right.
If successful, they could have easily turned the tide of the war and crushed the Prussians
from their left.
But stationed nearby Radaxdorf, Lieutenant-General Georg Wilhelm von Driesen commanded the reserve
cavalry.
Uncommitted and noticing the Austrian charge, he launched a counter-charge.
His cavalry clashed with the Austrian right flank.
Heavy combat broke out as the Austrians attempted to find their footing.
When it appeared the fighting would shift in the Austrian balance, the additional Prussian
cavalry reserves came to Driesen’s aid.
The Austrian cavalry crumbled, before the Prussian cavalry charged into the Austrian
infantry lines north of Leuthen.
Entire battalions threw their weapons away and fled, or surrendered.
Any soldier who attempted to make a stand was overrun by his comrades fleeing for their
lives.
The entire Austrian army collapsed into a rout - Driesen’s cavalry provided the nail
in the Austrian army’s coffin.
Against the odds, Prussia emerged victoriously.
Darkness soon set in, and surviving Austrians fled towards the Bohemian hills.
In total, the Prussians suffered 6382 casualties.
About 1200 dead, and the remainder wounded.
The Austrians lost 22.000 men.
Over 12.000 were captured, over 3000 dead and 6 to 7000 wounded.
17 Generals were dead or wounded, and 116 pieces of artillery and 51 standards were
seized.
They lost up to a third of their effective army fielded against Frederick, an enormously
high percentage.
Not just contemporary observers and later historians referred to the Battle of Leuthen
as Frederick the Great’s finest moment.
Even Napoleon acknowledged its genius.
Just like at Rossbach, everything went right for Frederick.
The knowledge of the battlefield, the extended enemy lines and the cooperation of Prussian
commanders, like a well-oiled machine - all thanks to the autumn war game training.
The artillery, infantry and cavalry worked together perfectly, with subordinates taking
initiative whenever the opportunity presented itself.
Frederick did not launch a pursuit until two days after the battle, leading to most Austrian
soldiers escaping across the border.
Some sources indicate these didn’t escape, but rather were pushed by Frederick’s belated
pursuit.
The implications of Rossbach were enormously favourable regarding the French.
The implications of Leuthen made an astronomical difference.
Frederick faced down and beat a high-morale, well-equipped, and recently victorious army.
If the Austrians had beaten him, the Kingdom of Prussia would have been no more.
There was no alternative to victory.
After the defeat, the Austrians retreated into Bohemia.
They still held Schweidnitz and Breslau.
Frederick subjected Breslau to a severe bombardment.
Within two weeks, the entire garrison surrendered.
Still, you can imagine the atmosphere in Vienna.
“Every face is marked by anguish and panic, and the general dismay is much more intense
than it was back in May following the defeat at Prague.”
(Venetian Ambassador Ruzzini)
The end of the 1757 campaign cemented Frederick’s reputation as a great military commander.
However, Frederick himself wasn’t in a triumphalist mood.
He told his subordinates that Leuthen “had been a sticker-plaster on his wounds.
It has not healed everything.”
Frederick saved the relief of Schweidnitz for next year’s campaigning.
His army took up winter quarters.
The campaign of 1757, a very prolonged campaign, came to an end.
Frederick fought eight battles.
Yet an epidemic hitting the winter quarters killed more soldiers than all eight battles
combined.
Still, the campaign was extraordinary, with many battles and a surprising number of reverses
and twists.
Frederick himself referred to it as “a campaign that was like three in one.”
But the war was far from over, and next year would bring renewed warfare, reverses and
twists.
Thank you very much for watching this video.