﻿The United States has a serious drug problem and it’s bigger than you think. With the Chinese
government strategically employing Mexican drug cartels as a pawn in its rivalry with
the United States, this issue, if not faced head on, will have geopolitical
consequences that will extend well beyond the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere.
Could the US military become the ultimate game-changer in this war? Let’s find out.
The opioid crisis has actually caused life expectancy within the country to decrease
over the last few years and fentanyl is one of the biggest reasons.
This synthetic opioid is much more powerful than traditional drugs. The CDC estimates
there were 100,306 drug overdose deaths in the United States between 2020 and 2021, up over
56,000 from the previous measuring period. The pandemic made the trend
which was already increasing even worse. Fentanyl, originating in China and shipped north
of the border by the Mexican drug cartels, is responsible for many of these deaths. The
crisis has led some American policymakers to consider declaring the Mexican drug cartels as
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), which would subject them to military force.
But what’s stopping this from happening? Why hasn’t the military taken part in
active anti-narcotics operations in the past? What obstacles would such a mission
face? And should the drug cartels south of the border be officially designated as FTOs,
what range of options would the United States Armed Forces have to intervene?
The Mexican drug cartels are vast criminal enterprises so powerful that they sometimes
compete with the government of Mexico itself for authority. Drugs, weapons smuggling,
human trafficking, cybercrime, and kidnapping are all part of their plethora of illicit
activities. They have their own territories that they govern as pseudo narco-states,
subjecting the populations within their control to their wills, and they have made
travel throughout the country much more dangerous for Mexican nationals and foreigners alike.
In March 2023, after an attack on a group of American tourists visiting Mexico which resulted
in two deaths, a group of Republican United States Senators led by Lindsey Graham (R-SC) introduced
legislation called the Ending the Notorious, Aggressive, and Remorseless Criminal Organizations
and Syndicates (NARCOS) Act. This bill would designate nine Mexican drug cartels as FTOs. The
designation would give American law enforcement agencies greater power to freeze their assets,
deny their members entry into the United States, and increase penalties for the people
who materially support these organizations. It would also give the United States military
options to take part in counter-narcotics operations that it does not now have.
Imagine a compound belonging to one of the Mexican drug cartels on Mexican soil.
Then imagine a drone-launched hellfire missile blowing the compound to kingdom come. This would
be one such option, should the U.S. government officially designate the cartels as FTOs.
Another possibility – imagine the Rangers, Green Berets, Navy SEALS,
or Delta Force conducting a targeted nighttime raid on that compound instead, almost like the
attack on Osama bin-Laden’s compound in Pakistan in 2011. That would also be an option if the
Mexican drug cartels were to get designated as FTOs by the United States government.
The idea of using the military against the Mexican drug cartels has been a frequent topic
of public discussion within the United States, but so far has not come to fruition. Why?
Although the thoughts of America’s best warriors bringing the cartels to justice are pleasant ones,
many policymakers in Washington fear that should the United States military
get further involved than its informal advisory role to law enforcement on drug-related matters,
it would threaten the country’s relationship with Mexico. For its part, the Mexican government has
historical reasons to be concerned about United States military involvement in its territory.
The United States has militarily intervened in Mexico several times in the past. In the
Mexican-American War between 1846 and 1848, the United States clawed vast tracts of
territory from Mexico in the resulting Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The United States also
used military force on Mexican soil while the latter country was in the throes of its
Revolution between 1910 and 1920. There, the US army was chasing Pancho Villa in a campaign
lasting from 1916 to 1917. The Mexican government has reason to be jittery and fear that American
military intervention within its borders could escalate into an outright invasion
or a painful counter-insurgency campaign. And the Mexican government has other reasons to
fear the cartels within their territory being listed as FTOs by the United States.
Although it is unlikely that Mexico itself would ever be listed as a state sponsor
of these organizations, the designation that there are FTOs operating within its
territory would still make foreign governments and companies assess it as riskier to invest in.
The designation would also hurt international tourism, which generates $20 billion a year in
Mexico and counts for about 8.5% of its GDP. Additionally, Mexico is a USMCA member with deep
ties to American companies. In March 2023 alone, trade between the United States and Mexico reached
$72.1 billion, an increase of 4.52% compared to March 2022. Trade between the two countries
is about three-quarters of a trillion dollars annually. If the drug war escalates through
American military intervention in Mexico, there is a risk for that trade to become disrupted,
increasing supply chain problems and the resulting inflation that the American public has been
dealing with for the past couple of years. The disruption of trade could worsen inflation
in other ways, too. Some of the United States’ biggest exports to Mexico are energy products.
These commodities include oil, gasoline, and liquefied natural gas. Such energy products
fulfill a demand worth about $11 billion in March 2023 alone. If demand from Mexico for
those products declines, the energy companies might be forced to raise prices on already
existing customers to make up the shortfall, increasing Americans’ energy bills.
Mexico also exports vast quantities of commodities that the US economy depends on,
such as completed vehicles (personal and commercial), vehicle parts, computers,
and medical equipment, among others. The economic consequences for disrupted trade on
Mexico would be further-reaching than inflation. The United States has dealt with an unprecedented
border crisis since 2021, as millions of migrants have made the perilous journey north,
with millions more expected in the months and years to come. If the United States military
intervenes against the drug cartels and, as an unforeseen consequence, disrupts the trading
network, say with the occasional errant drone strike, it will likely increase the amount of
people coming north seeking replacement jobs. So there are good reasons for opposition to the
designation of the drug cartels as FTOs by certain parts of Washington.
In trying to solve one problem, it becomes important to not create others of equal or
greater magnitude. Additionally, drug cartels do not set up shop in isolated compounds that are
vulnerable to drone strikes or special operations forces. Most of the time, the drug cartels’
infrastructure is less like the Osama bin-Laden compound and more like the insurgents in Iraq. The
cartels conduct their operations in the middle of cities and around a lot of commercial and
civilian infrastructure. That is another reason why many policymakers and experts are concerned
about the idea of American military intervention in Mexico. Imagine the headlines if civilians
there get killed in a drone strike by mistake? Additionally, the Mexican drug cartels are known
to use child soldiers as young as 11 years old. It is highly likely that these ruthless organizations
would put these children on the front lines in a confrontation with American troops. Such
incidents would undermine the image of the United States as the world’s humanitarian leader.
All the same, the drug cartels are a serious and growing problem,
with geopolitical implications that go far beyond the western hemisphere. As noted,
the Mexican drug cartels are essentially being used as a cat’s-paw by the Chinese government
in its competition with the United States. Since the fentanyl ingredients are manufactured
in China, the Mexican drug cartels have become a tool of Chinese government policy. The Chinese
military may not yet have the capability of withstanding a direct confrontation with
its American counterpart, but if China can exert levers which can lead to the deaths of thousands
a year in the American homeland through this indirect channel, it has greater leverage in
its negotiations with the United States. After then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit
to Taiwan in the summer of 2022, the world’s attention fell on the Chinese military’s
massive exercises off the island that lasted for several days. However, for the American homeland,
an announcement by the foreign ministry in the aftermath of Pelosi’s visit was much more
important. In it, the Chinese regime said it would suspend its cooperation with the United
States on narcotics trafficking, including in fentanyl. Transnational crime was also an area
that China announced its suspension of cooperation on. This announcement was a tacit admission from
the regime that it would shy even further away from intervention against fentanyl dealers and
their relationship with the Mexican drug cartels. As the Chinese regime controls the world’s most
sophisticated surveillance apparatus, it is highly unlikely that it is not fully aware of
its domestic fentanyl industry. Fentanyl shipments to Mexico are therefore a conscious policy choice
on the part of the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese regime’s drug policy is part of its
overall approach to foreign policy. The Chinese Communist Party is still haunted by what it views
as the “Century of Humiliation,” the years between 1839 and 1949 when China routinely suffered at the
hands of foreign powers. China sees its fentanyl partly as revenge for the Opium Wars of the 1830s
and 1840s, where the British Empire used military force to ensure it could sell its opium products
into the Chinese market. The Chinese regime sees fentanyl not just as a way to make a profit,
but part of a comprehensive historically-based foreign policy to ensure that it is strong and its
opponents weak. The United States government can therefore not stand idly by. As the Mexican drug
cartels are now an instrument of Chinese policy, they have become a player in the burgeoning great
power rivalry between the United States and China. It is unsurprising that many policymakers in
Washington are getting itchier to use a military response, especially since this tool of Chinese
statecraft is so close to home. Removing these dangerous middle men from the equation
would also make China’s destabilizing foreign policy more difficult for it to conduct.
With fentanyl increasingly being disguised as candy and other things that could be enticing
to children, it is clear that the problem is growing. The cartels themselves are also
getting more sophisticated and powerful. For example, the Los Zetas cartel has recruited
American soldiers as hitmen for their operations. Hundreds of thousands of people in Mexico work for
these sprawling criminal empires and many more benefit from the drug economy even when they are
not involved with the criminal element. Los Zetas and the other cartels have also
been building ever more sophisticated armored vehicles. These are not simply pickup trucks
with light machine guns attached to their backs, but armored trucks and personnel carriers with
sophisticated weapons like .50 caliber machine guns. Fortunately, the cartels have yet to equip
themselves with explosive turrets atop their vehicles like a proper tank, but they have
made use of grenade-dropping drones. The geopolitical consequences of the drug
wars and the growing sophistication of the cartels mean that the policy responses of
the past are no longer adequate to solve the crisis. A more proactive approach is needed,
especially with the increasing militarization of the drug cartels and the personnel that work for
them. The United States military’s restriction to a law enforcement advisory role is by definition
a reactive approach. So would there be alternative proactive approaches that would involve unleashing
the might of the armed forces on the cartels, ones which might involve less damage to Mexico
and with less risk of escalation or “mission creep” that could result in a grueling
counter-insurgency style of warfare? Two months before Graham and his cosponsors
introduced the NARCOS Act, Congressman Dan Crenshaw (R-TX) introduced the Declaring War on
the Cartels Act of 2023. This legislation would increase the United States’ ability to impose
sanctions on foreign governments or other entities determined to have assisted the cartels or failed
to have made adequate attempts to suppress them. Penalties would increase for individuals deemed
to be accessories to cartel-related crimes, with mandatory 15 year additional prison
sentences. Meanwhile, the law would require the Department of Homeland Security to create
an apparatus to monitor efforts in countries deemed to be affected by cartel activity.
The legislation would also loosen restrictions against US military involvement in Mexico,
but in a more careful way than if the cartels were designated as FTOs. Crenshaw said of that
possibility: “It doesn't necessarily mean just dropping bombs right away. Diplomatically, it
means that we have a whole new leverage over the government. The Mexican government does not like
to deal with this problem. They like to ignore it. This is obviously a real war. And they obviously
need our help. And we should have an authorization to allow that. I think this gives the president
leverage. And I would think it'd be a win.” Leverage over Mexico would be secured, Crenshaw
hopes, through the threat of military action against the cartels. The bill implies that if
the Mexican government were to believe that a military response from the United States would
happen regardless of its involvement, it would be more amenable to cooperating in the effort rather
than standing on the sidelines, forcing it out of its complacency to organized crime, which as
we will see shortly, is deeply ingrained within Mexico’s government and political culture.
The approach championed by Crenshaw would see joint operations between the United States and
Mexican militaries in a much harder line against the cartels, prompting the latter to go along
with the new status quo. With Mexico involved in such operations, there is less of a chance for
diplomatic misunderstandings or miscalculations. There would also be less chatter that the United
States would be “invading” Mexico by using its military in anti-drug operations.
Joint military cooperation between the two countries in anti-drug efforts would also reduce
the likelihood of “mission creep,” a common problem in United States military operations
of the past 20 years. Supposedly limited interventions have led to decades’ worth of
counter-insurgency operations, and the history of mission creep goes back much further than during
the War on Terror. For example, American military intervention in the Mexican Revolution led to a
campaign that eventually became an embarrassing debacle for the United States Army, despite its
initial victory. The last thing anyone wants is a similar, 21st century campaign in Mexico.
Close cooperation with the Mexican military of the like that the Crenshaw approach favors
would make that possibility less likely. Unfortunately, the prospect of securing the
cooperation of Mexico in this kind of escalation of the drug war is not guaranteed and brings with
it its own dangers. The country has a corruption problem, and the Mexican government has ties
with the cartels at every level and across every department. Critics have accused the
Mexican army of giving the cartels a wide berth to conduct their operations, while it merely stands
by and watches, at best patrolling the lines between the different cartels’ territories and
standing idly as they embarked on their illegal activities only a few hundred yards away.
The Mexican military had once taken a more proactive approach, but since the
rise of Manuel Lopez Obrador to the country’s presidency, the government’s policy toward
the cartels has become less confrontational. Famously, Obrador said that his approach to
pacify the drug cartels would involve “hugs, not bullets.” This was in response to earlier Mexican
policy that had seen the use of military force which did not always turn out splendidly.
In 2019, Obrador, in response to one of the cartels’ operations in the northern
city of Culiacán, ordered the release of Ovidio Guzman, son of the infamous drug
kingpin “El Chapo,” in an attempt to avoid further bloodshed. Unfortunately, the “hugs,
not bullets” policy has led to the passive policy of some Mexican army units we just talked about
and it raises questions about whether Congressman Crenshaw’s approach to the problem would find
cooperative ears south of the border. There would also be concerns that American
operations and other sensitive information could actually be passed along to the cartels. In the
middle of October 2022, a leak of more than 6.5 million documents exposed the deep corruption
within the Mexican government and military. A group of hackers going under the name Guacamaya
released the data and showed numerous embarrassing examples of official malfeasance. For example, the
Governor of the Mexican State of Tabasco between 2019 and 2021, Adán Augusto López Hernández,
put three known members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel in powerful positions
within the local security services. The result was that the cartel gained access to sensitive
information and powerful military weapons. The hacked information also revealed that Mexican
soldiers routinely sell weapons to the cartels, that law enforcement
officials took bribes (one such official took $250,000) to protect the cartels,
and that the military keeps detailed files on politicians and political activists, rather than
the members of the organized crime syndicates. Mayors throughout Mexico were also shown to
have close links with the drug cartels. The documents also revealed corruption north of
the border, too. The influence of the cartels permeated among officials at all levels of
government. One official in the United States was convicted of taking over $5 million in bribes from
the cartels. Thousands of investigations have been conducted or are pending.
President Obrador was dismissive of the hack, saying: “there’s nothing that isn’t
known or should not be known [in the leaks].” Unfortunately, the attempts at brushing over the
problems fooled no one, and the corruption problems on both sides of the border leave
the United States military in a bind, should it attempt cooperation with its Mexican counterpart.
Since corruption in Mexico goes high up the food chain of the defense ministry, there is a
high likelihood that the cartels would be tipped off to at least some of the strikes or raids on
their activities. Such leaks would put American soldiers in danger and increase the likelihood
of American blood being spilled on Mexican soil. The risk of escalation, and all the problems that
come with it that we already went over, would significantly increase at that point.
For these reasons, there is a good possibility that Congressman Crenshaw’s approach would fail.
The more unilateral sudden strike approach of Graham and his cosponsors becomes easier
to justify when viewed in the light of Mexico’s corruption problems involving the cartels. Indeed,
sharing military knowledge and equipment with the Mexican military is all but asking for some
of it to fall into the hands of the cartels. This was precisely how the Los Zetas cartel
got its start. Designating Los Zetas and their peers as FTOs skips several steps and
reduces the possibility that they will gain access to American equipment and secrets.
Regardless of the United States military’s role in the drug wars, it is likely that Washington will
need to take more active measures against the Mexican cartels. The status quo is increasingly
anathema to American interests – these are not even the drug wars of 10 years ago. The entrance
of fentanyl and the Chinese Communist Party into the equation changed things dramatically. Look
for more legislative proposals from Senators and Congressman to come in the near future which will
include the potential use of military force. But what do you think? Should the US military get
involved in the war against drugs? In what way? Let us know in the comments
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