The deadly failed launch of the Challenger space shuttle was one of the most shocking
disasters in American history, but it didn't come out of nowhere. From faulty
equipment to the fates of the astronauts, keep an eye out for these misleading myths.
It was an uncharacteristically cold morning at Kennedy Space Center on January 28,
1986. But that wasn't going to stop the launch of the space shuttle Challenger. As it left
the ground amidst the roar of its engines, everything seemed to be perfectly fine. But
just 73 seconds into the launch, when the shuttle was about 46,000 feet into the atmosphere, it was
suddenly surrounded by a massive fireball and dramatically broke into pieces.
Pilot Michael Smith's final recorded words of "uh-oh" were the only indication that the
astronauts knew something had gone awry. Parts of the shuttle may have reached as
high as 65,000 feet before crashing into the Atlantic Ocean. No one on board survived.
The disaster was soon followed by an intensive investigation, as well as much
media attention. But as much as the Challenger disaster became a part of recorded history,
Considering the tremendous physical damage that occurred shortly after takeoff, many assumed
that the astronauts inside the Challenger must've met their ends quickly. However,
the shuttle itself didn't break up immediately after the fuel tanks failed. It only did so as
it moved uncontrolled through the atmosphere. At that point, the crew cabin remained intact,
and the astronauts were likely still alive as it began to fall back towards Earth.
Whether or not the crew remained conscious isn't entirely known. It's likely that the crew cabin
lost pressure. Deprived of oxygen, the astronauts would have lost consciousness fairly quickly,
even with the personal egress air packs that contained emergency air.
However, a 1986 report from NASA biomedical specialist Joseph P.
Kerwin noted that during the recovery process, it was determined that at least three of the
packs had been activated, which can only happen manually. This indicates
that there were astronauts conscious long enough to activate the packs.
"There's all kinds of evidence that you died when you hit the water."
When viewing the footage of the Challenger disaster, it's easy to conclude that the shuttle
exploded. There's a large fireball quickly followed by the disintegration of the rocket
and shuttle. But a closer look shows that the breakup technically wasn't an explosion at all.
Essentially, the root cause of the disaster was a fuel leak in the shuttle's right
solid fuel rocket booster. During the launch, that escaping fuel caught fire,
weakening connections between the booster and the large liquid fuel rocket. Eventually,
the booster broke loose, swung around, and pierced the liquid fuel tank, releasing liquid oxygen. The
liquid hydrogen fuel tank had also already been compromised by the fire and had begun
to leak as well. When the two fuels mixed, they ignited and created the large fireball. However,
the boosters actually survived this catastrophic failure and continued
flying on their own until NASA officials remotely detonated them over the Atlantic.
The shuttle also survived the fireball, at least for a short while. It continued flying
for a moment, but soon after breaking away from the fuel tanks, the aerodynamic forces acting
upon it tore the craft apart. Ultimately, while the fireball was quite dramatic,
it had few of the auditory or physical effects of an explosion, such as a shockwave or loud noise.
Though many spectators were shocked, at least some people at NASA knew that something could
go wrong. An official investigation found that the fuel leak had been caused by faulty O-rings
manufactured by the company Morton Thiokol. The O-rings were meant to seal joints in the
solid fuel rocket boosters. Their failure meant that fuel leaked and ignited during the launch.
Less than a day before the launch, engineers at Morton Thiokol raised
serious concerns about the O-rings. The main issue was the unusually cold
temperatures predicted for the next morning. At the time of the Challenger's 11:38 a.m. launch,
it was only 36 degrees Fahrenheit. However, the O-rings that helped to seal the joints in the
rocket boosters were rated to fly at a minimum of 39 degrees. Morton Thiokol engineers knew
this and frantically urged their managers and NASA officials to delay the launch.
But after multiple delays in the shuttle program, NASA was anxious to move forward with the launch,
and the engineers' concerns were overruled. One engineer named Allan McDonald refused to
sign off on the launch and later brought attention to NASA officials' attempts
to cover up important details, like how they had pushed Morton Thiokol managers
to approve the boosters despite evidence that disaster loomed.
"Make sure that what you thought was important got to the right people.
You know, that's what I wished I would've done."
Some examinations of the Challenger disaster point not just to faulty O-rings,
but also issues with the putty used to help seal those joints. Moreover,
some have gone so far as to blame an environmental push for the disaster, saying that a move away
from heat-resistant asbestos putty was a contributing factor to the failure.
But while the putty sealant had been replaced, that was done before any such
regulatory change came into effect. In fact, the replacement putty also included asbestos. Some
sources claim that the new sealant's asbestos came in the form of longer,
thicker fibers that may have weakened the sealing properties of the putty.
However, it's not clear that this was a major factor in the joint failure.
What may have been a more serious issue were the
tests that NASA conducted on those joints. According to the Rogers Commission Report,
engineers had suggested the joint leak checks forced air through the putty and O-rings,
creating blow holes in the putty that may have weakened the joint. Ultimately, however,
whether or not the putty contained the right kind of asbestos likely didn't matter, as investigators
concluded that the source of the disaster wasn't in the putty at all, but rather the O-ring seal.
Firsthand accounts of the Challenger disaster make it clear that NASA officials were anxious to move
the launch forward. Some sources have claimed that President Reagan wanted it to happen before
the upcoming State of the Union so that he could have a call with the astronauts during his speech.
But this was reportedly just a rumor, and indeed, Reagan delayed the State of the Union by one week.
"This is truly a national loss."
If the pressure wasn't coming from the president, then where did it originate?
It may well have been from inside NASA itself. The agency had been combating
flagging interest in the space program, poor internal and external communication practices,
and general frustration stemming from previous launch delays.
It would be easy to think that something went wrong with the Challenger shuttle
itself. After all, like all the other space shuttles, it had main engines on the craft
in addition to the rocket boosters meant to get it into orbit. Those engines used
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, which were mixed to combust and provide power.
However, the truth is that the Challenger worked fairly well. For a brief moment or
two after the fuel rockets failed, it continued flying on its own,
though the intense physics of its high-speed uncontrolled flight through the atmosphere
soon caused it to break apart. If not attached to the rocket,
the shuttle could have theoretically been able to return to Earth as a glider under minimal power.
Ultimately, the Rogers Commission found that the shuttle's main engines had nothing to do with the
accident. NASA continued using the engines for later launches and remains so confident in the
main engine design that it's even using it as part of the next phase of its rocket missions.
It's fair to say that once the Challenger launched, there was little chance of escape.
According to the Rogers Report, early on in the shuttle program,
a thrust termination procedure was considered. This would've allowed for the rocket boosters
to stop firing mid-flight, allowing crew members to evacuate the vehicle.
However, this proved to be tricky in practice. The aerodynamic forces that bore down on a
shuttle mid-launch were quite significant. Though ejector seats were integrated into
the first few shuttles built, the function was disabled only a
few launches in. They would have been ineffective at such high speeds anyway.
By the time Challenger was built, the ejector seats had been removed entirely from the design.
In the aftermath of the disaster, this notion was revisited. But it was quickly disregarded in favor
of a mid-flight escape maneuver that would have astronauts bailing out of a side hatch and then
parachuting off a telescoping pole. Ejection seats were impractical in the shuttle's two-floor crew
cabin, while similar rocket-powered techniques sometimes tore test dummies to pieces. While
the bailout plan was tested by Navy personnel and astronauts were trained to complete it,
the maneuver was never needed and certainly wouldn't have helped the Challenger astronauts.
"Nobody planned for anything like this."
Cold weather was rightfully considered a major factor in the Challenger disaster. However,
putting all of the blame on low temperatures doesn't offer the fullest picture of what
happened. Issues with the O-rings had already been known to officials and were observed after
launches on higher-temperature days. Furthermore, investigators suggested that the rocket section
joints had further issues. These included a sealant putty that may have contained enough
air holes that could've directed heat and fuel towards the O-rings, damaging them further.
But perhaps the biggest problem of all wasn't the result of the damaged O-rings or faulty putty,
but an inflexible decision-making process. NASA officials were clearly anxious to go forward with
the launch. They were pushed along by the desire to deploy scientific equipment at the right time,
avoid expensive delays, and recapture flagging public interest in the nation's space program.
Some have also suggested that Christa McAuliffe's
schedule played a role. She was set to teach on the fourth day of the mission,
meaning a delay would've had her teaching on the weekend with no children in school.
Perhaps the most ridiculous myth surrounding the Challenger disaster
is the idea that at least some of the seven astronauts managed to survive. Or rather,
that they never got on the shuttle in the first place, knowing that they were taking
part in a murky conspiracy meant to control the public via a media-ready catastrophe.
According to this theory, the disaster was orchestrated to traumatize young
people and make them more compliant. But evidence for this notion is pretty shaky,
as it's based on claims that living professionals and academics are the surviving astronauts. If so,
they're not exactly doing a good job at laying low. For instance,
why would astronaut Judith Resnik fake her death and take on a new life as a high-profile
Yale academic with the same name? Similarly, the theory that Ellison Onizuka took on the identity
of his brother Claude generates a new mystery regarding the whereabouts of the original Claude.
At any rate, a careful look at the details associated with the genuine astronauts
and their supposed doubles shows multiple discrepancies in basics like graduation dates
and physical appearances. Unfortunately, it's far more plausible that all of the
Challenger astronauts really did die, as their bodies were recovered from the Atlantic Ocean.
"No matter how much you grieve, it won't do any good,
it won't bring 'em back. So I just have to accept it."