In the 2009/10 season, Jose Mourinho guided Inter Milan to an unprecedented treble.
No Italian club has since won Serie A, their
domestic cup the Coppa Italia, and the UEFA Champions League in one season, and only six
teams have done it ever.
Inter are the most recent Italian team to win the Champions League and have not won
a league title since the treble.
While Mourinho has been categorised as a defensive coach, his 2008/09 title winning Inter
side led the league in goals scored with 70, joint with AC Milan, while in 2009/10, they
scored 75 goals, seven more than next best Roma; in both seasons, Mourinho’s side also conceded the fewest.
This partly stems from the Portuguese manager’s superb defensive organisation and his
team’s willingness to play almost exclusively on the counter.
Mourinho set his side up as either a 4-3-1-2, or a 4-2-3-1.
Both systems were built on the rock-solid centre-back pairing of Lucio and Walter Samuel,
with Julio Cesar , an adept reader of the game, as a sweeper keeper operating behind.
The defence sat deep and relied on the mobility of the midfield to cover.
Club captain and legend Javier Zanet played mostly at left-back, though
he was sometimes used in central midfield.
Indeed, a defining facet of Mourinho’s Inter was his willingness and ability to deploy
players to counter specific threats, or bring specific abilities to a game.
On the right, Maicon provided more width and was a more attacking
presence than his left-back counterpart.
For this to work, Mourinho relied on Esteban Cambiasso’s superb reading of the game.
The Argentine midfielder could move back or across
to cover, allowing Maicon to push up behind Samuel Eto’o, who drifted infield to support Diego Milito.
Eto’o’s role, and that of Goran Pandev, are rightly hailed as examples of Mourinho’s
ability to get players to buy into his tactical systems,
even at the expense of their own, normal playing style.
While Eto’o did drift centrally to assist Milito in many games, he was also used almost
as a defensive winger when required, and Pandev, nominally a striker, played a similar role on the left.
This meant that in games where Mourinho needed defensive solidity, the 4-2-3-1 almost reverted to a 4-4-1-1.
Inter sat deep and countered, relying on the predatory instincts of Diego Milito, the
awareness and creativity of Wesley Sneijder at 10, and Cambiasso’s ability to pick a long pass.
Inter would win the ball back, get it to Cambiasso or Sneijder, and would then attack
from deep with long passes wide, or using the Dutch 10’s ability to play in Milito or Eto’o.
Dejan Stankovic, the more attacking-minded central midfielder, got up to support, while
Sneijder also dropped off to win the ball back, as well as pushing forwards to assist Milito.
Eto’o could cut inside with Maicon supporting him and Pandev could do the same, although
this occurred less.
Indeed, Mourinho famously even used Christian Chivu , a left-back, in left midfield against
Barcelona in the second leg of the Champions League semi-final at the Nou Camp to block
the left-hand side of the pitch; Milito, Eto’o, and Sneijder were the team’s main goal threats.
Mourinho was not afraid to sacrifice attacking ability to counter the threat of Messi on
Barcelona’s right hand side, just as he was not afraid to match Chelsea’s 4-1-2-3
with a 4-3-3 ​ in the Champions League Round of 16 away leg,
man-marking Chelsea’s system at the expense of his own attacking options.
His side made no effort to hog possession either,
instead relying on a clinical ability to convert the rare chances that came their way from the counter.
Pragmatic, organised, tactical – yes.
Defensive and boring?
Not always.
Jose Mourinho’s superb Inter of 2009/10, built by him with
the additions of Sneijder, Lucio, Eto’o, Milito,
Pandev, and Motta to the squad he inherited in 2008, is the best side Italian football
has produced in the last ten years and, arguably,
since Sacchi’s AC Milan.