Hello, I’m Anastasia Lin and I am pleased to say that this is my first video acting
as spokeswoman for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
They are doing ground-breaking work on China and how Canada, and the rest of the world,
should engage with the Communist superpower.
In this video I am going to review some of the key points about China raised by Michael
Cole in his recent MLI paper about Chinese sharp power.
Michael notes that many have cautioned that the People’s Republic of China would one
day threaten the system and values that define Western civilization.
They were routinely dismissed.
They were alarmist, critics said.
Worse, they had a Cold War mentality, or were “anti-China.”
The popular view was that engagement would eventually make China become more like us
— liberal, rule-abiding, and perhaps even democratic.
Beyond a doubt, the West’s openness was instrumental in helping China develop its
economy and lift millions of people from poverty.
Those who hoped the Communist Party would modernize along similar lines, however, were
in for disappointment.
Instead, the Party clung to an authoritarian one-party ideology that is alien to the West,
while ramping up a Chinese nationalism that has reached an alarming pitch.
Meanwhile, the Party tightened its controls on all aspects of Chinese society.
They continued cracking down on dissidents, the press and intellectuals, threatening democratic
Taiwan, breaking promises over Hong Kong, and launching a disturbing “thought reform”
campaign against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
Whereas Chinese President Xi’s predecessors had wisely opted not to defy the international
system, Xi overturned that policy, largely in reaction to perceived weakness in the democratic
world, weaknesses such as failing moral self-confidence, the 2008 financial crisis, and the UK’s
decision to leave the EU.
China would use its new influence and economic might to refashion the world order in a way
that suited its ambitions.
Money-- of which there was no shortage in Beijing--went far in undemocratic countries
in need of infrastructure investment whose leaders resented transparent and accountable
alternatives such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
The “China model” thus took off across Africa, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.
However, that strategy could only go so far.
To get its way with democracies, Beijing needed a novel approach.
It was one thing for China to conduct business with autocrats, but democracies impose rules
of transparency, and leadership changes, that stood in the way of Beijing’s ambitions.
What was required was a way to circumvent those rules and to undermine the democratic
firewall.
In other words, the Party needed to change us – to make our societies more like China’s.
For several years, China pursued an energetic charm offensive, showering Western institutions,
corporations and governments with money, opportunities, and the hope of more to come.
Chinese tourists and students poured in, as did visiting experts and buyers of all things
Western.
Targeted countries simply lacked knowledge about who they were dealing with.
Most believed they were interacting with ordinary Chinese firms, officials, journalists, and
representatives — and most were, indeed, normal.
But little attention was paid to possible connections to the Chinese security apparatus,
the Party’s United Front Work system, or to the pervasive ideology that underpinned
their activities.
Gradually, China deployed a constellation of media, chambers of commerce, businesses,
think tanks, cultural associations, and other entities to manipulate, intimidate, confuse,
and distract our officials, intellectuals, business leaders, and the Chinese diaspora.
Hidden to many, China’s political warfare and influence operations created China-cheerleaders
in academia.
The activities also silenced critics of the Party, and helped the Chinese military, often
through front companies, to acquire the technology it needed to modernize its forces.
This now threatens stability across the Indo-Pacific.
Revelations of odious Chinese penetration and intellectual property theft in the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, the Czech Republic and elsewhere in recent years have
sparked an awakening that was long overdue.
Authoritarian China is now an undeniable presence in almost all Western countries, including
Canada.
Our societies therefore need to weigh the benefits of continued business-as-usual engagement
against the costs to the values we cherish.
Through various initiatives, the United States is now leading the charge by bringing together
like-minded d emocracies that increasingly see the need for a concerted response to China’s
challenge.
Unfortunately, Ottawa does not appear to understand the urgency of joining that concert of democracies.
Whether due to naivety, a romantic attachment to a China that no longer exists, or as an
act of defiance against Washington, the government remains unserious in its approach to China.
True, Ottawa did not allow the acquisition of Canadian construction giant Aecon by a
Chinese state-owned enterprise.
On the other hand, it allowed other transactions with national security implications.
It allowed Chinese telecom Huawei to participate in the recent installation of underwater monitoring
devices near an American naval base on the west coast.
The government still has not banned Huawei from supplying equipment to the next generation
5G wireless communications network.
And Ottawa has made no secret of the importance it attaches to a free trade deal with China.
Michael Cole warns that, unless there is a change of heart, Ottawa risks turning Canada
into a weak link in the alliance of democracies.
Failure to make the right decision could cost us dearly.
What is at stake is nothing less than a stable and peaceful world order that helps keep us
all safe and offers the world the best hope of prosperity and freedom, now and into the
future.
I’m Anastasia Lin for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.