Our series on “How to Defend Against the Mongols” has shown how all manner
of peoples around the world found ways to fight against attacks by
Mongol armies in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In the final part of this series,
we examine the most pressing question of all: After the breakup of the Mongol Empire,
how did the Mongols defend themselves against attacks from other Mongol armies? In this video,
we will look at some of the strategies the Mongols had to use against each other.
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Let us begin with the Toluid Civil War, the first and most important of the Mongol civil
wars. Ariq Böke and Khubilai were younger brothers of Möngke, the last recognized Great Khan of the
united empire who died in 1259, and both wished to succeed him. Ariq was based in the old Mongol
capital of Qaraqorum, located in the Orkhon Valley in Mongolia, while Khubilai was based in Kaiping,
a city he had constructed in today’s Inner Mongolia. From this position,
Khubilai controlled access to Mongol-ruled Northern China. While Ariq had more support
from other members of the imperial family for his claim as Great Khan, Khubilai had more immediate,
practical advantages. Ariq did not have access to large armies, while Khubilai
controlled many of the armies which had just been used in the war against the Song Dynasty,
leaving Khubilai to start the war off with a tremendous advantage in manpower. Furthermore,
Qaraqorum was reliant on a constant flow of grains and other food supplies to supplement
its largely non-nomadic population. When war broke out, Khubilai cut off Ariq’s
access to food supplies from North China and invaded Mongolia, defeating Ariq in battle
in autumn 1260, and forcing Ariq to abandon the untenable position at Qaraqorum in the
face of Khubilai’s advance. For a conflict over who had the right to rule the Mongol Empire,
making it clear Ariq could not hold the imperial capital was a powerful symbolic move. Khubilai’s
armies forced Ariq to withdraw to the Yenisei River Valley. While the Yenisei is a comparatively
rich agricultural region, with the cultivation of wheat, millet and barley going back millennia,
it was insufficient against Ariq’s enemy. Ariq was reduced to border raids and infighting with
his own allies, before a harsh winter eradicated his herd animals and forced his surrender by 1264.
From the outset, Khubilai was more willing to commit to all-out war against his brother; Ariq
appears, until quite late, to have been under the impression Khubilai would recognize Ariq’s claim,
giving Khubilai a head start in preparing for war. Khubilai’s ability to bring the resources
of Mongol-ruled China to bear against Ariq, and thereby cut Qaraqorum off from supply, was the
ultimate card in Khubilai’s favour. While the details of the battles between Ariq and Khubilai
are sparse, Khubilai’s armies consistently had the better of the engagements, and Ariq
had far fewer troops to call upon. Khubilai’s advantages were beyond what Ariq could muster.
The defeat of Ariq Böke was not the end of Khubilai’s troubles with his family
members. With Qaraqorum rather exposed, Khubilai permanently moved his capital to two cities;
Kaiping in Inner Mongolia, renamed to Shangdu, and Dadu, also called Khanbaliq, on the site of modern
Beiing. The result, though, was that Khubilai’s control over much of Mongolia was tenuous,
and subject to raids from princes who continued to resist. Qaidu, of the Ögedeyid Khanate, and his
ally Du’a of the Chagatai Khanate, dominated Central Asia and raided Khubilai’s frontiers
from the Tarim Basin to western Mongolia. A host of independent princes, largely sons of
the previous Great Khans Möngke, Ariq Böke and Güyük, held minor courts from Dzungaria,
the Altai Mountains to the Yenisei River valley, switching from fighting each other, to allying
with Qaidu, to at times joining Khubilai. In the fast eastern part of Mongolia and in Manchuria,
the descendants of Chinggis Khan’s brothers also proved rebellious. Thus throughout his efforts
to complete his conquests in China and abroad, Khubilai Khan had to send troops to deal with his
cousins in Mongolia continuously. While none had the power to overthrow Khubilai Khan, they could
threaten his hold over Mongolia and other border regions. Khubilai had to find ways to deal with
almost annual attacks along a vast frontier. Around 1271, Khubilai dispatched his sons
Nomoqan and Kököchu with a large army into Mongolia, pushing onto Almaliq to drive back
Qaidu while another army pushed across the Silk Road cities of the Tarim Basin. By 1275,
these gains had been reversed. Hoqu, a son of Güyük, succeeded in driving Khubilai’s armies from
the Tarim Basin. The next year, a mutiny by the princes Shiregi and Tuq-Temür in Mongolia resulted
in Khubilai’s sons being captured and sent to the Golden Horde, where they spent the next decade.
Then, Shiregi and Tuq-Temür attacked Qaraqorum. However, the princes’ fragile alliance soon
frayed, and Shiregi and some of the other princes abandoned Tuq-Temür to join Khubilai. At the same
time, Khubilai sent a large response force under his star general, Bayan of the Ba’arin,
and Tuqtuqa of the Baya’ut Qipchaq. Both were experienced commanders, with Bayan the mastermind
of the final conquest of the Song Dynasty. Leading an army of horse archers, including
a thousand Qipchaq warriors, they defeated Tuq-Temür near Qaraqorum. Shiregi was forced
to execute his former ally Tuq-Temür, before being sent off to exile on an island off China’s coast.
Khubilai was pleased with the performance of his generals, particularly Tuqtuqa, whose warriors
became one of the key arms of his anti-Mongol defense. Parallel to the Mamluk Sultanates in
Egypt and India, Khubilai felt the best way to deal with steppe horse archers in battle was
better-equipped horse archers. Tuqtuqa’s family had been Qipchaq lords before the Mongol conquest,
and the Mongols recognized their military potential and dispersed them around the empire as
frontline troops. Tuqtuqa’s father Banduchaq was assigned to Khubilai’s armies during his conquest
of the Dali Kingdom in Yunnan in the 1250s, and had proved their mettle again during the
war against Ariq Böke. The Mongols always sought to reward those who showed hereditary ability,
and following the defeat of Shiregi, Tuqtuqa and his men were given promotions and vast tracts
of land around Khubilai’s capital at Khanbaliq. Further, Qipchaq slaves and soldiers in Khubilai’s
realm were assigned to Tuqtuqa’s command. In 1286, they were formed into a regiment called
the Qipchaq Guard [Qincha wei 欽察衛 ], consisting of a core of various Turkic steppe warriors fighting
from horseback, supplemented by Alans, Mongols and thousands of former Song Dynasty infantry and
archers. The command of the Qipchaq Guard was held by Tuqtuqa’s descendants until the end of Mongol
rule in China. Though one of several such guard units, the Qipchaq Guard was by far the largest,
richest and most prestigious and held tremendous influence in the Yuan realm.
The Qipchaq Guard was soon put to the test. In 1287, a revolt broke out in eastern Mongolia, led
by Prince Nayan, a descendant of Chinggis Khan’s youngest brother Temüge, with another revolt in
Manchuria by Prince Qadan. Nayan overcame Khubilai’s commander Bayan of the Ba’arin,
and it was feared the Nayan would coordinate with Qaidu and seize Mongolia. Khubilai Khaan, by this
point in his early seventies, depressed, obese, gout-ridden, and nearing the end of his life,
roused himself for one more march. According to the Yuan Shi, Khubilai was frustrated that his
own Mongol troops showed hesitation to fight other Mongols— their tendency was to dismount and chat
in Mongolian, rather than fight. Khubilai called upon the Qipchaq Guard, who had no such issues
and would be merciless. From a command post on the back of four elephants, Khubilai Khan went on his
final campaign, backed by the Qipchaq Guard, while other Yuan armies blocked the advances of Qaidu
and Qadan, preventing them from linking up with Nayan. Against the full might of Khubilai Khan,
Nayan was overcome. Amongst Khubilai’s units were top-of-the-line weaponry; a brigade of Koreans in
his service apparently brought with them handheld gunpowder weapons, leading night assaults on
some of Nayan’s encampments. Nayan himself was defeated, captured and executed, though some of
his allies continued to resist for several years. Tuqtuqa was put to the task of reducing them, too.
After Khubilai Khan’s death in 1294, his grandson Temür succeeded him as Great Khan,
ruling under the name Öljeitü Khan. Among the first things he did was richly reward Tuqtuqa
and his son Junqur, and then send him to the frontiers to continue battling Qaidu and his
allies. This consisted of repelling annual raids or launching their own expeditions into
enemy territory west of the Altai. Tuqtuqa spent the rest of his life in Mongolia,
dying there in 1297. His son Junqur inherited his position as commander of the Qipchaq Guard.
Under Temür Öljeitü Khan, a more structured defense system was set up across the frontier. In
a vast arc stretching from the original homeland of Chinggis Khan along the Onon-Kherlen Rivers
to the northern foothills of Tibet, a series of commanders were stationed with thousands of
troops to respond to incursions. Temür Öljeitü Khan put overall command under his brother,
Kammala, in Qaraqorum. He also expanded a policy of his grandfather Khubilai of sending vast
numbers of Chinese labourers into the regions and Qaraqorum, to establish self-sufficient
communities, expanding agriculture and crafts production to support these large
frontier garrisons and reduce some of the state burden in equipping and feeding them.
Temür Öljeitü Khan switched to an offensive stance after his son-in-law, Körgüz, King of the Önggüt,
was captured and killed by Du’a in 1298. A furious Temür Öljeitü called upon the resources
of his empire. While Khubilai had continued to send invasion forces over the seas and
into southeastern Asia until his final days, Temür Öljeitü halted almost all other military activity
and directed the might of the Yuan Dynasty against Qaidu and Du’a. He appointed his nephew Qayishan
as overall commander of the Yuan forces in Mongolia, and provided him with a vast army
backed by the Qipchaq Guard under Jungqur and his son, El-Temür. In early 1301, a series of
battles were fought around Mount Tiejiangu south of the Altai Mountains over several
days. Despite the fierce clashes, the outcome was inconclusive, and Qayishan fell back to Qaraqorum,
Qaidu’s troops harassing him the entire way and burning the pasture behind him. However,
both Qaidu and Du’a were injured in the battles, and Qaidu succumbed to his wounds soon after.
Du’a lost his interest in fighting against the great power of the Yuan Dynasty;
when rumour came a few years later of a threatened coordinated attack against the Chagatai Khanate by
the other Khanates, Du’a submitted to Temür Öljeitü and invited the other khanates to do
the same. Over the course of 1304, the various Mongol Khanates all once again recognized the
overlordship of the Great Khan, a recognition Temür’s grandfather Khubilai never achieved. As
a part of this, Du’a and the Yuan divided the territories of the late Qaidu between them.
Despite similar quality of troops and tactics, the Yuan Dynasty was continually victorious in these
wars. It was able to continually use its vast resources against its rivals, setting up numerous
garrisons to respond to incursions and showing greater unity of command, allowing it to bounce
back from defeats when they occurred and bring its elite troops into play. Meanwhile, its enemies
were reduced to hit-and-run tactics and plagued by infighting. While Yuan advances were halted in
Southeastern Asia and Japan, against other Mongol troops the Yuan were able to perform much better.
Other strategies can be observed in the wars between the Ilkhanate in its conflicts with
the Golden Horde and Chagatai Khanate. The Ilkhanate and Golden Horde first went to
war almost concurrently with the Toluid Civil War. These battles were largely fought over the
Caucasus Mountains, which the Golden Horde invaded repeatedly from the 1260s to the 1380s, hoping to
seize them from the Ilkhanate and its successor states. Many of these battles were inconclusive,
and the frontline rarely shifted. The opinion of the written sources from the Ilkhanate and later,
is that while the Khans of the Golden Horde could field immense armies, the Ilkhanid
troops were better equipped. In the narrower, uneven terrain of the Caucasus mountains,
the better supply lines and equipment of the Ilkhanid troops could be maximized, though rarely
do we have any precise details on the course of these battles. The Ilkhans often responded
to these incursions personally, taking with them their keshig and most elite units to prevent the
Golden Horde’s horsemen from advancing too deeply. The Ilkhanid soldiers largely fought defensively,
rarely pursuing their foes back into the steppes. In late 1262, Hülegü’s son Abaqa did just that,
only to be lured into a trap by Berke Khan and routed. While fleeing, Abaqa crossed over the
frozen Terek River, only to lose even more of his army when the ice broke beneath them.
The shocking defeat soured the Ilkhanate on any further expeditions into Golden Horde territory.
Following the end of the initial conflict, Hülegü’s successor Abaqa, constructed a
wall and ditch along the Kura River and left a garrison there to defend it, ensuring it would
slow down any Golden Horde advances long enough for the Ilkhan to respond in force. For its part,
the Golden Horde left a large, permanent garrison in the steppes north of the Caucasus, to prevent
the Ilkhans from ever attempting to make that journey north again. The result was an effective
stalemate; both states were far too powerful to overcome the other or its defensive preparations.
To the east, with the Chagatai Khanate, the Ilkhanate’s frontier was more open and harder to
defend with such static works. The Ilkhans left garrisons in that region, and often put their
designated heirs in charge of Khurasan, tasked with responding to attacks by the Chagatais or
the Negüdari raiders from Afghanistan. Here, the Ilkhanid responses were somewhat less effective,
and many of the Chagatai or Negüdari raiding parties escaped before the Ilkhan’s troops could
arrive. On rare occasions where larger-scale invasions did occur, as by the Chagatai Khan
Baraq in 1270, the Ilkhans responded personally in great force. Abaqa Ilkhan caught Baraq Khan
near Herat in 1270, successfully outmaneuvering Baraq and inflicting a crushing defeat upon him.
The Ilkhanid army appears not only to have been much larger, better equipped and better supplied,
but it was better led, too, compared to the Chagatayid army, which even seems to have had
trouble feeding and supplying horses for its men in the dry conditions around Herat in July 1270.
After Baraq Khan’s death, Abaqa then invaded the Chagatai Khanate, a rare occurrence for him, and
thoroughly sacked Bukhara, one of the chief cities of Transoxiana and the Chagatai lands. The message
was clear; major attacks on the Ilkhanate would result in major retaliations. It was not until the
1300s that the Chagatai undertook larger-scale attacks on the Ilkhanate again. The success of
these too, were generally halted by effective Ilkhanid responses or Chagatai infighting. At
times the Chagatais tried to coordinate these attacks on the Ilkhanate with the Golden Horde,
but the timing never quite succeeded and the Ilkhans always managed, with some difficulty,
to respond to them one-by-one. An attack by the Chagatai Khan Esen-Buqa on the Ilkhanate in 1315,
was halted due to an invasion of the eastern Chagatai Khanate by Yuan Dynasty troops; border
forces under Junqur and the Qipchaq Guard drove deep into the Chagatai lands, seizing pastures,
animals, families and cities. Fear of coordinated assaults between the Ilkhanate and Yuan Dynasty
against the Chagatai Khanate, and the increasing instability in the Chagatai Khanate from the late
1320s onwards, put an end to such efforts again. These khanates could unleash devastating warfare
on each other, but each one was too powerful to be conquered; the resources necessary for the
task would require each khanate to leave its lengthy borders exposed. Even for the states
that had the relative advantages, the Ilkhanate and Yuan Dynasty, victories were still costly,
bloody affairs and the campaigns expensive occurrences. We will talk more about this topic in
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